CONSORTIUM OF NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY STUDIES IN ASIA

SECURITY BEYOND BORDERS

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Workshop on Humanitarian Emergencies and Human Security: Lessons from Aceh

INTRODUCTION

Asia is a region where major natural disasters often occur. But while the extent of human loss, misery and suffering are often found among the poverty-stricken areas of Asia, the state capacity for disaster preparedness and managing humanitarian emergencies are often inadequate.

The impact of natural disasters affects the security of states and societies. Whether in the form of torrential floods, earthquakes or tsunamis, these disasters threaten the survival and well-being of people. They heighten the insecurities of the most marginalized and vulnerable populations in the region as poverty, disease and environmental degradation set in during the aftermath of these disasters. Natural disasters therefore generate complex emergencies that require urgent and coordinated responses from a broad range of state and non-state actors. Unfortunately, many states in Asia are minimally prepared to cope with these complex humanitarian emergencies. This gap is vividly illustrated in the region's recent experience with the 2004 Asian tsunami where the impact of the humanitarian emergency could have been far more devastating if not for

The impact of the 2004 tsunami remains visible even after three years.

the humanitarian assistance provided by Western countries and international aid agencies.

In this respect, the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia) held its first sub-regional workshop on 3–4 September 2007 at the Hermes Palace Hotel in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, jointly organized by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia. Entitled "Humanitarian Emergencies and Human Security: Lessons from Aceh", the workshop's aim was to raise the awareness of the regional and international community about the security implications of natural

disasters. Specifically, its objective was to underscore the need for disaster preparedness, prevention and management of humanitarian emergencies to mitigate the attendant threats to human security.

In his welcoming remarks, **Rizal Sukma** from CSIS, noted that the workshop aimed to do the following:

- To understand and enhance the awareness of regional states on the security implications of natural disasters
- To promote a better understanding among government agencies, policymakers, international agencies and civil society organizations on effective preparedness and management

of natural disasters, including the provision of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief operations, reconstruction and development

• To strengthen regional mechanisms to deal with humanitarian emergencies in the region and enhance regional cooperation in disaster prevention and management

Mely Caballero-Anthony from RSIS gave a brief introduction to NTS-Asia and its role in facilitating information

exchange among scholars and mainstreaming non-traditional security (NTS) issues. In her introduction, she noted that non-traditional security challenges are apparent in the Asian region. Given the rapidly changing global environment, the notion of security is no longer confined to threats emanating from external sources. In addition to securing borders, people, values and institutions, there is a need to be conscious of other menaces that have not always been classified as threats to state security.

Among these is the massive devastation to lives and property that comes as a result of any natural disaster. Ensuring state and human security therefore embraces far more than the absence of wars and violent conflicts, and it includes protection from risks and threats that may be sudden and beyond one's control. There is, therefore, a strong need to continue to build national and regional capacity. In closing, she thanked CSIS, which is one of the members of NTS-Asia, for its efforts in organizing the workshop.

NATURAL DISASTERS AND HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES: LESSONS FROM THE 2004 TSUNAMI

Panel on Natural Disasters and Humanitarian Emergencies:Lessons from the 2004 Tsunami - Stephan Sakalian (ICRC) and Reiko Niimi (OCHA).

Three years after the 2004 tsunami in Aceh, its devastating impact lingers on. Disaster-relief efforts and international assistance came from 34 countries, making it the biggest non-military operation in 50 years.[1] It is without a doubt that, with such massive repercussions, several lessons can be learnt from the various stages of the crisis.

In providing a conceptual overview of crisis management, **Kwa Chong Guan** from RSIS noted the importance of learning from the

experience of others sectors—such as the corporate world—in crisis management, thereby improving states' own abilities and capacities. There are various types of crises, namely (i) natural disasters, (ii) political crises, (iii) crises due to human judgement or error, and (iv) crises due to technological failures. Kwa explained the importance of identifying what would be considered an acceptable risk when addressing these crises as it could pave the way for planning the various stages in crisis management.

Four categories of issues that decision-makers need to respond to during a crisis were identified (see Table 1). The first is anticipating a crisis in order to plan for contingencies. Kwa noted that the desired planning or performance level of a contingency plan is one that is able to manage elements of interactive complexities and chaos. Such a system would require a substantial degree of high-risk tolerance, providing an emphasis on recovery and resilience. Fostering this high-risk tolerance, however, remains a policy issue that needs to be developed.

The second category of issues revolves around making sense of the situation after the crisis. This involves determining why warning systems fail, assessing the extent of the damage while dealing with the lack of complete information and agreeing on what "story" should be told to the public.

The third category of issues pertains to decision making. In this category, government officials have to consider public responses to their actions. They would also need to carefully assess what sort of damage-control measures should be taken. This is important, as the measures taken could be perceived to be biased or

1 Mangkusubroto, K. (4 September 2007), *Post Disaster Rebuilding in Aceh*, presented at a Workshop on Humanitarian Emergencies and Human Security: Lessons from Aceh, Hermes Palace Hotel, Banda Aceh

Table 1: Response stages during a Crisis.

politically driven. Crisis-management groups also have to assess the effectiveness of their contingency plans and make room for further improvisation.

The final category of issues revolves around "meaning making" or ensuring that credible information is being communicated to the various groups and sectors affected by the crisis. This stage requires efficient filtering of rumours and rival stories as well as calibrating information releases from various sectors. By doing so, officials would reduce the possibility of blame games and thus maintain their credibility in the eyes of the public. Effective communication systems are therefore vital in ensuring a smooth positive resolution to the crisis. This would also be important in ensuring that crisis-and disaster-management officials are not implicated in any inquiries of mismanagement that may jeopardize the government's credibility.

The speakers in this session also reflected on the lessons learnt from the 2004 tsunami in Aceh. **Stephan Sakalian** from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), began by acknowledging Aceh's unique situation as a region struggling to rebuild from both a post-disaster and post-conflict situation. These two conditions have the potential to complicate humanitarian efforts in Aceh.

The ICRC, which has been present in Indonesia since 1979, was already active in Aceh prior to the tsunami. The ICRC was therefore in a position to respond promptly in the wake of the tsunami, by operating in four main areas. Firstly, it assisted in the distribution of emergency items such households items, hygiene kits, food rations, and clean-up and reconstruction kits. The ICRC also housed 2,400 families in internally displaced people (IDP) camps. Secondly, the ICRC assisted in providing clean water and sanitation

by cleaning wells, constructing communal washrooms and supplying water-treatment chemicals and clean drinking water. Thirdly, the ICRC provided forensic and medical assistance. Finally it assisted in restoring family links through its ICRC Restoring Family Links (RFL) website. After its assessment work in 2006, the ICRC handed over its tsunami-related activities to other humanitarian actors and focused on assisting victims of the past conflict.

According to Sakalian, four main lessons from the Aceh tsunami (and other natural disasters) made the ICRC rethink its role. Firstly, there is the need to enhance the ICRC's capacity to respond more efficiently to the rapid onset of the crisis and adapt to an increasingly complex, demanding and competitive humanitarian environment.

This would be facilitated by the ICRC's newly formed Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU), created in June 2006 in line with the newly adopted ICRC institutional strategy for 2007–2010. Secondly, it is important to strengthen the response capacity of local humanitarian actors in the area of RFL, in the event of other disasters. Thirdly, there is the need to preserve a space for neutral and independent humanitarian action in conflict zones affected by a natural disaster. Finally, there is the need to provide government guidelines and best practices for domestic facilitation and regulation of international relief and initial recovery assistance. This last issue was highlighted in a recent research carried out by the International Federation of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent (IFRC), which noted: (i) gaps in the scope and geographic coverage of international agreements; (ii) ill-equipped domestic laws to address the common legal issues arising from international disaster responses; and (iii) the lack of harmonization and uniformity between states' national legal frameworks. In order to improve the situation, the IFRC established International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) guidelines to be presented and discussed with states during the 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in Geneva in November 2007.

Reiko Niimi, from the UN Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Jakarta, presented the lessons learnt by OCHA from the post-natural disaster efforts in Aceh. Firstly, there is the need for greater mainstreaming of disaster reduction. This includes the following aspects: (i) search-and-rescue teams; (ii) expert groups to save lives; (iii) a more effective process of requesting for disaster-relief assistance; and (iv) early-warning systems. Secondly, Niimi noted the need for institutional preparedness by improving organizational and response capacity. Thirdly, better coordination between UN agencies and humanitarian actors

is also necessary. This could be done via a cluster leadership approach with an emphasis on the protection of social welfare in times of conflict and disasters. Much more research, however, needs to be done regarding this cluster-leadership approach in order to generate effective results.

A fourth lesson learnt is the need for integrated information tools as a significant mechanism for efficient disaster response. While it is important for all parties involved to agree on one set of management tools, the effectiveness of such tools is dependent on the input from the various parties. This is also linked to the fifth point on the need for a common assessment of the methods used by agencies, so as to minimize the burden on disaster victims. These include streamlining agencies' queries to victims and facilitating more equitable decisions in favour of the victims. Since the responses to disasters evolve over time and differ in severity, the distinction between humanitarian response and humanitarian development is blurred, thus complicating the transfer of appropriate funding needs at the various phases of the post-disaster period. Finally, there is the need for greater accountability and transparency via better quality control standards and unified systems. This is important in determining how funding is spent and divided in Aceh, which in the post-tsunami period housed over 300 agencies.

During the discussion session, several questions were raised regarding the role of humanitarian agencies. In response to a question on how the ICRC goes about enhancing its position during a state of martial law, Sakalian highlighted the importance of humanitarian organizations being neutral and independent in order to overcome the difficulties linked with security concerns. Access to victims and the mobility of humanitarian workers in sensitive areas are possible only if dialogue exists between all parties to the conflict, i.e. governments and non-state actors.

In this regard, the speakers also expressed the need for the military and other state officials to be sensitized to the role played by humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC and OCHA. Sakalian noted ICRC's efforts, for instance, in providing pre-deployment training to state troops assisting in relief operations, so as to be aware and better able to identify humanitarian actors, their respective roles and mandates, and how best to coordinate with them. Niimi also noted the importance of civil-military coordination. OCHA's response in Aceh was facilitated by close coordination with the Indonesian military, as the latter was overwhelmed by the task of coordinating the vast amount of foreign military assistance, particularly in the area of coordinating air and port access. While such responsibilities would normally be beyond the auspices of the UN, it was nevertheless vital, given the high degree of uncertainty during the crisis. Sakalian therefore suggested further enhancing civilian-military relations, in particular via joint military exercise among countries in the Asia Pacific.

The critical role of civil society in facilitating communication among the various groups during tsunami relief efforts was also raised. The commendable role of Air Putih was cited. Air Putih is a volunteer group of information technology experts that restored wireless Internet access in Aceh after the tsunami. This was crucial for the dissemination of information between those working on the ground in Aceh and the rest of the world. While civil society is also important in the frameworks set up by humanitarian organizations, conflicts between the state and non-state actors (NSAs) could emerge to impede humanitarian assistance. This was the case for the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which established an RDU when it was working in the post-conflict period before the tsunami.

ADDRESSING NEEDS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN

Women and children are often the most vulnerable groups in any humanitarian emergency. This plight is most pronounced in a post-conflict and patriarchal society like Aceh, as many families lost their men during the conflict. The tsunami, therefore, further heightened the suffering and desperation of affected women and children.

In addressing the issues surrounding violence against women in Aceh, **Sandra Hamid** from the Asia Foundation, Jakarta, noted that, according to on-site reports in the wake of the tsunami, there was an increase in cases of violence against women as compared to pre-tsunami periods. This was due to the perception among the Acehnese people that women were to blame for the tsunami. Locals claimed that the earthquake and tsunami occurred as a result of the degrading moral values in Aceh. As bearers of values in Aceh, women therefore bore the brunt of the blame. There was a rise in the number of reported divorce cases, 80 per cent of which were related to domestic violence.

A number of reasons were given for the rise in the reported cases of violence. Firstly, women became more aware of the avenues available to them to report cases of violence. This was due to the increasing awareness of human rights, propagated by international organizations in Aceh. Secondly, the increasing number of unemployed men in Aceh, who were unable to tap onto the resources available in the post-tsunami period, led to a growing sense of marginalization. Frustrated men then vented their anger on their wives. The post-conflict situation after the tsunami only served to worsen the situation as the lack of income further fed the frustration. This also has some historical significance as Aceh is home to one of the strongest patriarchal societies in Indonesia and is governed by Islamic law.

Ingrid Kolb-Hindarmanto (UNICEF) and Clara Juwono (CSIS Foundation)

Several measures should therefore be taken to prevent violence against women. Firstly, it is important to provide sufficient employment options to the victims of disasters. Secondly, given the fact that Aceh is a post-conflict zone, measures should also be taken in the disarmament demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process. Ex-combatants should, for example, be re-trained to adapt to family life. Thirdly, there is the need to further consolidate and streamline the legal processes in Aceh, while keeping the safety of women in mind, especially in remote rural areas, as very little action is taken against perpetrators there. This is due to the lack of clarity in legal processes. Given the existence of Islamic law (shariah), local practices (adat) and national legislation, Acehnese are often in a dilemma as to which set of standards to use. Members of GAM also complicate this by suggesting that Acehnese should not comply with national legislations. Fourthly, training should be given to the various sectors, such as the police, government officials and local community leaders, regarding gender issues and human rights so as to sensitize them to women's

issues. Finally, women empowerment programmes need to go beyond the basic skills of sewing and cooking, and organizations that do not typically take on women's issues (such as financial and administrative agencies) need to incorporate the needs of women, especially those who have lost their men to the tsunami or conflict.

In addressing the needs of children, **Inggrid Kolb-Hindarmanto** from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), noted that UNICEF's work in the wake of the tsunami was largely devoted to preventing and limiting the exposure of women and children to violence, abuse, exploitation and infectious diseases. This includes providing clean water and immunization. UNICEF also conducted a rapid assessment (within 72 hours) of the tsunami, focusing on the following areas: (i) the impact of the tsunami on women and children; (ii) human-rights implications and violations; iii) the impact on other actors; (iv) the impact on UNICEF; (v) major dynamics and issues; (vi) what life-saving measures to take; and (vii) organizing and making sense of the information available to them.

Sandra Hamid (Asia Foundation) and Reifqi Muna (LIPI)

Cluster coordination could also be strengthened by: (i) engaging governments fully in the coordination of response and ensuring clarity in coordination linkages at all levels; (ii) developing a framework for action with cluster partners (including funding strategies); (iii) conducting joint assessments, identifying gaps and developing solutions; (iv) monitoring and ensuring capacity and quality of interventions; and (v) streamlining progress monitoring, accurate reporting and feedback. The key functions of strengthened cluster coordination include information management, technical guidance and donor liaison/resource mobilization. Improved contingency plans are also important as donors more often than not provide only short-term support. An example of this is the UN's Emergency Preparedness and Response Project (2006–2010) that builds preparedness at the national and provincial levels as well as improves internal response capacity.

With regards to lessons learnt from the tsunami, Kolb-Hindarmanto noted the following: (i) the importance of national ownership, response coordination and partnerships; (ii) the need for agencies and partners to contribute according to their strengths and capacity; (iii) the critical need for community participation and engagement for effective recovery and rebuilding; (iv) the significance of training and preparedness; and (v) acknowledging that the lack of standardization, guidelines and protocols leads to the low quality of response.

MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: REDEFINING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT?

The military has traditionally focused on war operations and strategy. However, the growing incidence of non-traditional security threats such as natural disasters that require quick and effective response has expanded the military's role. In light of this expanding role, should military rules of engagement be changed? Presenters in this session argued that the focus should be on the roles and practices of the military.

Heryadi from the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI), noted that military operations other than war (MOOTW) are clearly stipulated in several national legislations, such as Law 3/2002 on National Defence and Law No. 34/2004 on the TNI. TNI's non-

traditional role includes disaster-relief operations and classic civil-military operations, evacuation, hospitalization, logistic distribution and assisting in building temporary shelters. According to the TNI standby arrangement, disaster-relief operations require armed forces personnel to be utilized for immediate response, after which the reins are handed over to other agencies such as civil society organizations. The duration of a disaster-relief operation, however, varies, depending on the scale of the disaster. This also has implications on TNI's standard operating procedures (SOP) before their relief mission. According to their SOP, the planning and preparation for launching a relief operation

requires gathering information and assessing the situation on the ground. Once this is completed, the mission can be defined and be issued with an operation order.

Riefqi Muna from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta, further noted that the reason why the military's role in humanitarian emergencies is pivotal is that, unlike civil-society groups, it has systemic capabilities, which civilians do not possess to respond to complex situations. These include tactical and organizational strategies, human resources and, most importantly, speed, which is essential in providing quick response to emergencies.[2] There is, however, the problem of

2 Muna, R. (3 September 2007), *The Military and Humanitarian Assistance: Redefining Rules of Engagement?*, presented at a Workshop on Humanitarian Emergencies and Human Security: Lessons from Aceh, Hermes Palace Hotel, Banda Aceh

effectively deploying this military assistance. Ideally, in democratic societies, political institutions decide when to commence military operations. However, this could be problematic, as seen during the tsunami in Aceh, where the lack of speed and capacity of the civilian bureaucracy to respond to the critical situation on the ground hampered military deployment. The political elites in Jakarta were therefore not aware of the real extent of the disaster in Aceh and relied mostly on news sources for information. Furthermore, incomplete information due to disrupted communication lines caused by the earthquake and tsunami resulted in underestimating the extent of the devastation, which in turn generated inadequate responses and allocation of resources.

In light of this, a clear command-and-control relationship between civilians and the military has to be underscored in order to efficiently manage any humanitarian operation. This can be done by ensuring effective SOPs and working mechanisms for military commanders and local government so as to streamline thinking processes between the two sectors. It is also necessary for the host country to take effective charge in coordinating international assistance. Even so, presenters acknowledged that putting terms such as cooperation and

Panel on Military and Humanitarian Assistance: Redefining Rules of Engagement – Heryadi (TNI), Samsu Rizal Panggabean (CSPS) and Reifqi Muna (LIPI)

coordination into practice remains a tedious task.

It was also suggested that the military's principles of engagement must be based on humanity, impartiality and neutrality—not just in theory but also in practice. Thus, further training within the military on their technical roles in MOOTW should be instituted. Soldiers have to understand that non-war operations require a doctrine that is different from classical military operations. Training would also aid in building mutual trust and understanding between military and civilian personnel. This is vital in understanding local practices and overcoming language barriers.

On the issue of balancing state sovereignty vis-à-vis humanitarian assistance, it was noted that the current environment is one where the borders are no longer clear. Many problems have now become trans-national, thereby recognizing either trilateral or regional responses. Examples include the trilateral relations between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, the establishment of an ASEAN security community and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). There have been concerns, however, that such organizations are still embryonic in nature and hence the problems often encountered are on implementing effective policies.

NGOS AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

Apart from the lack of communication and coordination among the various parties during the post-tsunami period, another set of effects, though less obvious, that also has a significant impact on disaster-relief developments are the underlying socio-political changes taking place within Aceh society. **Imam Prasodjo** from the Nurani Dunia Foundation, Jakarta, cited three major factors

that precipitated these changes: (i) the long conflict period, which resulted in a divided Acehnese community; (ii) the 2004 earthquake and tsunami that destroyed their sources of livelihood; and (iii) the massive influx of international aid, which opened Aceh to the outside world in a way that has never happened before. As a result, the Acehnese people have had to interact

with a wide variety of parties, both institutions and individuals, from vastly different socio-cultural backgrounds. (For details on socio-political changes in Aceh before and after the tsunami, see Table 2).

Some positive changes have emerged from this interaction: (i) Acehnese no longer feel marginalized; (ii) the tsunami may

Table 2 : Socio-political changes in Aceh*	
Before Tsunami	**After Tsunami**
• Closed/relatively homogenous society	• Open/pluralistic society
• Limited role played by civil society organizations (CSOs)	• Greater role played by (CSOs)
• Lack of freedom due to conflicts, martial law and civil emergency	• More freedom with the implementation of the special autonomy law
• Less economic equity due to conflict	• Larger shares of revenue under special autonomy law
• Military/police are dominant players	• Military/police less dominant due to presence of CSOs.
• Unfavorable environment for peace talks	• Greater national and international pressure to make peace talks successful
• Development policies implemented mostly by unskilled bureaucrats and contractors.	• Development policies implemented by diverse group of players (including local and International NGOs) with better skills, knowledge, experience.
• Relatively cheaper price for labor and resources	• Higher price of labor and resources due to inflation

* Prasodjo, I. (3 Sept 2007), *Efforts to Rebuild Aceh with Vision*, Presentation at Workshop on Humanitarian Emergencies and Human Security: Lessons from Aceh,Hermes Palace Hotel, Banda Aceh

Ian Small (OXFAM) discussing the role of NGOs in providing humanitarian assistance.

(ii) it was critical to develop not only social capital but also the bridges and links between the various forms of capital; and (iii) government agencies had not played an effective management role. In light of this, Prasodjo noted the role played by Nurani Dunia in the wake of the tsunami. The foundation's mission is to ensure that all emergency aid and reconstruction efforts must contribute to the development of social trust and cohesion and of human and social capital.

While the foundation has played a significant role in building capacity at the grassroots level, there remain two major challenges. Firstly, while there is financial and physical (infrastructure) capital, human capital is lacking, as many are attracted to projects and activities that offer higher pay. While such a move is inevitable, presenters noted this high level of mobility would have implications on any building sustainable social capacity in Aceh. Without sufficient human capital, it becomes a challenge to make all existing projects sustainable in the long run. Secondly, there is the

have served as a release valve for anti-military and anti-Javanese sentiments in Aceh; (iii) changes in power structures have made the Acehnese more conducive to the peace process; (iv) stronger domestic and external pressures for peace; (v) improved developments in Aceh, given the increased support and presence of experts and technocrats;

and (vi) the Acehnese people may have benefited from a transfer of skills and technology.

Prasodjo noted three main gaps that needed to be addressed during the post-tsunami period: (i) large numbers of people and institutions were willing to help but this was hampered by the lack of coordination;

challenge for the provincial and national governments to consolidate local customs and practices, within the basis of Indonesian society. Although this remains a tedious task, it is without a doubt a vital element that needs to be considered in social policies and governance so as to ensure the resilience and sustainability of Aceh.

Relating the OXFAM experience during the tsunami, **Ian Small** from OXFAM, Banda Aceh, noted that his organisation provided for the socio-economic development needs of disaster victims by working with both community-based and governmental groups. OXFAM also began an initiative in March 2005, whereby

USD 500,000 was given to victims as an incentive to find employment and resume their normal lives. Yet there have been difficulties, such as problems of uninvited workers and water shortages, resulting in lower wages and price increases respectively. There has also been difficulty in catering to the people's needs as expectations increased over time. In terms of housing, the expectations of the people have increased as they now want full brick houses, thereby raising the costs for reconstruction and rebuilding. In this regard, he emphasized the need to be able to predict public responses, given the diverse cultural and demographic circumstances.

Small also questioned the extent to which lessons learnt from the tsunami would be effectively translated into policy. He was of the opinion that bottom-up information gathering would be more beneficial to donors rather than the victims themselves. He also noted that the process of accountability requires meaningful dialogue, especially with the disproportionate communities. Yet, such dialogue is difficult to establish, given the changing expectations of disaster victims and the culture of corruption in Indonesia. Such a long-term process also requires an extension of international assistance, such as OXFAM, to sustain the progress.

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS IN RESPONDING TO HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES

The role of regional and multilateral institutions is critical, given the broadening of the security paradigm, which includes non-traditional security (NTS) issues. In this session, **Mely Caballero-Anthony** from RSIS, explained the significance of NTS issues, which embody human-security concepts that have been on the rise, given the increasing impacts of globalization. Moreover, NTS issues are trans-national in nature and complex, and therefore require more than just efforts from ministries of defence. Citing the example of Singapore's response to the SARS pandemics as an example, several other agencies other than the Ministry of Health were mobilized to address the problem. For instance, immigration checkpoints were put on alert to check for the transmission of diseases and quarantine, while the Ministry of Environment was mobilized to ensure that the environment was clean and free from potential breeding areas of infectious diseases.

There is also the need for greater awareness of NTS issues as a basis for greater regional cooperation mechanisms, such as regional rapid-deployment units, early-warning systems and information sharing.

Rizal Sukma (CSIS) and Mely Caballero Anthony (RSIS)

Equally important is the need to mainstream NTS issues into the regional political frameworks and Caballero-Anthony cited existing arrangements in ASEAN and the ARF as possible mechanisms to develop regional preparedness and build capacity to respond to the various security challenges. The sharing of best practices in emergency preparedness among regional neighbours would also enhance states' capacity in dealing with disasters. The ASEAN Disaster

Management and Immediate Response (ADMAIR) was cited as one such avenue to facilitate the exchange of ideas. However, before such practices are shared with the region, there is the need to convince people at the national level of the effectiveness of such practices. It was further noted that, given the difficulty in trying to come to a consensus on certain issues, it would be better address such issues bilaterally or trilaterally.

POST-CONFLICT AND POST-DISASTER REBUILDING: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Kuntoro Mangkusubroto (Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh)

Rebuilding after a conflict or disaster is never easy. Yet Aceh, in many aspects, is a prime example of successful rebuilding after a conflict and a disaster. A key factor in the success was the establishment of the Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh (BRR) in early 2005. **Kuntoro Mangkusubroto** from BRR, explained that the agency had a four-year mandate to focus on: (i) restoring livelihoods and strengthening communities; (ii) facilitating and coordinating partner programmes; and (iii) coordinating and implementing government projects.

There were various challenges faced by BRR, such as the vast geography covered, the huge cost of reconstruction (although estimated at USD 8.5 billion, only USD 6.1 billion has been committed), the huge scope of project management, involving 12,000 projects, issues of laws and regulations, limited local

capacity and working with former GAM members in promoting local ownership and developing skills for better career opportunities. There was also the challenge of ensuring a smooth transition to local governments. The BRR addressed this by encouraging and applying community participation in the overall reconstruction of Aceh and upholding accountability and integrity as the foundation of trust from all stakeholders. Mangkusubroto also highlighted that while the BRR tried to work efficiently by not overlapping with the duties of the local government, the local people still turned to the BRR rather than to their local government for assistance because they did not feel that their local governments would be able to play an effective role. It was part of the BRR's policy to encourage and build the capacity of local governments to prepare them to continue what the BRR had started.

Ten lessons from the BRR's experience could be applied to other emergency reconstruction programmes: (i) create a single agency with full authority to clear all obstacles and do everything required to deliver an effective reconstruction programme; (ii) establish authority within the agency to coordinate donor programmes and implement programmes in their own right by focusing on filling gaps, not competing with delivery partners; (iii) support state regulations that grant authority for the agency to move quickly, for example, by directly appointing contractors to short circuit long procurement processes; (iv) be flexible and responsive so as to adapt to changing circumstances and requirements; (v) establish and maintain the trust of all stakeholders through transparency, accountability and the highest professional standards; (vi) manage risks of overlap and poor cohesion effectively through parallel processes in order to be quick and responsive; (vii) minimize layers of bureaucracy—especially of institutions headquartered outside the project area—by delegating authority to local representatives for greater relevance, speed and effectiveness in decision making and implementation; (viii) minimize "flag-waving" by reconstruction players to avoid unproductive competition and, worse, possible rejection by local communities; (ix) identify and promote breakthrough initiatives to become part of standard state practice elsewhere in the public sector; and (x) develop local capacity to ensure sustainability.

Table 3 : Measuring Aceh's Success in Peace Implementation*		
Variables	**Indicators**	**Situation in Aceh**
Peace agreement	Easier when present	Better agreement reached through better process: "incentive compatibility"
Number of warring parties	Easier with two than three or more	Two
The likelihood of spoilers	Spoilers who pose daunting challenges	Lack of opportunity structure for spoilers; no predation and widespread fear; AMM did not face any
Collapsed state	Lack of state institution and governing capacity	Indonesia is a consolidating democracy
Number of soldiers	High number of soldiers (50000), making the situation difficult	Reduced
Disposable natural resources	Access to disposable resources	Lack of access for warring parties
Hostile neighbours	Interstate competition, regional conflicts, presence of patrons	None
Demands for secession	Difficult where the wars are fought over national sovereignty	The Helsinki process dropped independence from the agenda

* Panggabean, S. R. (4 September 2007), *Post Conflict Rebuilding: Where do we go from here?*, presented at a Workshop on Humanitarian Emergencies and Human Security: Lessons from Aceh, Hermes Palace Hotel, Banda Aceh

In conclusion, Mangkusubroto noted several areas that need to be managed carefully: (i) the transfer of assets and ongoing projects to local and national institutions; (ii) the re-engagement of ministries in the future of Aceh.; (iii) to provide support to the Governor in developing an integrated four-year economic plan that provides a framework for both transition and reintegration (Aceh Recovery and Development Framework); (iv) to provide support to the Governor in strengthening the provincial leadership team; and (v) maintain the technical focus through Joint Secretariats while supporting Kabupaten/Kota Recovery Forums as the vehicle for wider stakeholder engagement.

In highlighting the experience of post-conflict rebuilding **Samsu Rizal Panggabean** from the Centre for Security and Peace Studies (CSPS), Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, provided an overview on the post-conflict situation in Aceh. He first outlined the success of peace implementation in Aceh, which included two years without renewed war, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of separatists, implementation of law by the Acehnese government and peaceful election in December 2006. Panggabean then explained why the peace implementation in Aceh is considered successful with the use of several variables and indicators (as seen in Table 3). Essentially, peace implementation in Aceh is a success due to incentive compatibility, a lack of opportunity structure for spoilers, the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia, the reduced number of soldiers, a lack of access for warring parties, no hostile neighbours and the demand for independence.

While this is a positive sign, there still remain some hazards that need to be addressed. For one, the peace process does not deal with police reform and issues such as criminal-justice sector reform, demilitarization, reintegration and the demobilization of ex-combatants. There is thus the need to establish a competent police force to foster peace and good governance, to protect people and build vital infrastructure to ensure the freedom of movement. This, however, remains an uphill task, as there is a lack of trust among former antagonists.

Panggabean concluded by noting several factors needed to sustain long-term peace building. First, to avoid a "no war, no peace" situation in Aceh, which includes addressing the issues of chronic poverty, under-development, continuing violence, divided group relations and weak public services, and internal security problems. Second, to transform GAM into a political party so as to strengthen local government capacities. Third, to improve pro-poor development strategies. Fourth, to promote civilian security through police and judicial reform. Fifth, to build local capacity for human rights and reconciliation. Finally, to establish regional and international support for long-term peace building.

CONCLUSION

RSIS and CSIS participants in Banda Aceh

It was without a doubt that the workshop had provided much food for thought and greater insight regarding the difficulty in meeting the needs of everyone affected in a disaster. Preparing for natural disasters is therefore critical. This includes ensuring that the international community is able to come together to respond immediately and provide humanitarian assistance in times of natural calamities. Rather than wait, it is vital to be consciously prepared to mitigate the impacts that disasters bring.

The themes of the workshop were succinctly summed up in the acronym PASCOE.

- **Presence of the international community and NGOs as being significant actors in facilitating progress of relief and rehabilitation work**

- **Access of resources and information to all parties involved**

- **Speed to move about and need to accelerate the processes**

- **Coordination among the various actors, which needs continuous and further discussion**

- **Exit strategy, which has not been given sufficient attention but should be further examined and discussed**

**CONSORTIUM OF
NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY
STUDIES IN ASIA**
SECURITY BEYOND BORDERS

WORKSHOP PROGRAMME

Sunday, September 2

Arrival of
participants: Hermes Palace Hotel
Jalan Panglima Nyak Makam
Banda Aceh, Nanggroe Aceh
Darussalam
Indonesia

20:00-22:00   **Welcoming Dinner**

Monday, September 3

08:30-09:00   **Opening Session**

Dr Rizal Sukma
Deputy Executive Director
Centre for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, Indonesia

Dr. Mely Caballero Anthony
Coordinator, Non-Traditional Security
Programme & Secretary-General,
NTS-Asia, S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, NTU, Singapore

09:00-10:30   **Session One**

**Natural Disasters and Humanitarian
Emergencies: Lessons from the
2004 Tsunami**

Speakers   Mr. Stephan Pierre Sakalian
Adviser for Multilateral Affairs in Asia
International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Ms. Reiko Niimi
Deputy to Resident Coordinator & Senior
Advisor for Tsunami Recovery, UN Office
for the Coordination for Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA), Jakarta, Indonesia

Chair   Mr. Kwa Chong Guan
Head, External Programmes
S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, NTU, Singapore

10:30-11:00   **Coffee Break**

11:00-12:30   **Session Two**

**Addressing the Needs of Women
and Children**

Speakers   Dr. Sandra Hamid
Director, Aceh Program
The Asia Foundation, Jakarta, Indonesia

Ms. Inggrid Kolb-Hindarmanto
Planning Officer
UNICEF, Jakarta, Indonesia

Chair   Mr. Reifqi Muna
Researcher
Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI),
Jakarta, Indonesia

12:30-13:30   **Lunch**

13:30-15:00   **Session Three**

**The Military and Humanitarian
Assistance: Redefining Rules
of Engagement?**

Speakers   Maj. Gen. Heryadi
Expert Staff on International Relations
to the TNI Chief of Staff,
TNI Headquarters, Jakarta, Indonesia

Mr. Reifqi Muna
Researcher
Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta,
Indonesia

Chair   Dr. Samsu Rizal Panggabean
Head, Center for Security and Peace
Studies (CSPS)
Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta,
Indonesia

15:00-15:30   **Coffee Break**

15:30-17:00   **Session Four**

**NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance:
Issues and Challenges**

Speakers   Dr. Imam Prasodjo
Chairman
Nurani Dunia Foundation, Jakarta,
Indonesia

Mr. Ian Small
Senior Program Manager
OXFAM, Banda Aceh, Indonesia

20:00-22:00   **Dinner**

WORKSHOP PROGRAMME

Tuesday, September 4

09:00-10:30	**Session Five**
	The Role of Regional and Multilateral Institutions in Responding to Humanitarian Emergencies
Speaker	Dr. Mely Caballero Anthony Coordinator, Non-Traditional Security Programme & Secretary-General, NTS-Asia, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU, Singapore
Chair	Ms. Clara Juwono Vice Chair CSIS Foundation, Jakarta, Indonesia
10:30-11:00	**Coffee Break**
11:00-12:30	**Session Six**
	Post-Conflict and Post-Disaster Rebuilding: Where Do We Go from Here?
Speakers	Dr. Kuntoro Mangkusubroto Chairman Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh
	Dr. Samsu Rizal Panggabean Head, Center for Security and Peace Studies (CSPS) Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
Chair	Dr. Mely Caballero Anthony Coordinator, Non-Traditional Security Programme & Secretary-General, NTS-Asia, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU, Singapore
12:30-13:00	**Concluding Session**
13:00-14:00	**Lunch**
14:00-18:00	**Excursion to Development Projects in Banda Aceh**
20:00-22:00	**Dinner**

Wednesday, September 5

Departure of participants

**CONSORTIUM OF
NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY
STUDIES IN ASIA**
SECURITY BEYOND BORDERS

LIST OF CHAIRPERSONS & PAPER PRESENTERS

1. Dr. Mely Caballero Anthony
    Coordinator, Non-Traditional Security
    Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of
    International Studies (RSIS), Singapore

2. Dr. Sandra Hamid
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4. Ms. Clara Juwono
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5. Ms. Inggrid Kolb-Hindarmanto
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    Banda Aceh, Indonesia

6. Mr. Kwa Chong Guan
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    Yogyakarta, Indonesia

11. Dr. Imam Prasodjo
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    Jakarta, Indonesia

12. Mr. Stephan Pierre Sakalian
    Adviser for Multilateral Affairs in Asia
    International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
    Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

13. Mr. Ian Small
    Senior Program Manager, OXFAM
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14. Dr. Rizal Sukma
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3. Mr Edouard Beigbeder
    Chief, UNICEF NAD-Nias
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    Head
    ICRC Sub-Delegation
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11. Mr. Jeliteng Pribadi
    Aceh Recovery Forum
    Banda Aceh, Indonesia

12. Prof. Yusni Sabi
    Rector
    Ar-Raniry State Institute for Islamic Studies
    Banda Aceh, Indonesia

13. Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo
    Member, Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation
    Former Ambassador to Austria, France and Australia

14. Dr Syah Rizal
    Ar-Raniry State Institute for Islamic Studies
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15. Ms. Monica Tanuhandaru
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