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Investing in Papua: The Dual Challenges of Governance and Development

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Recent events surrounding the Special Autonomy status of Papua in Indonesia have caught the eye of the international media and engaged public opinion. In particular, the protests in Jayapura in early July 2010 illustrated community tensions in Papua. This paper attempts to carve through the economic and political issues surrounding these events to analyse and evaluate the economic and political challenges in Papua, and thus provide an assessment on the prospects for conflict resolution.

Photo of Jayapura



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Executive Summary

Overview

On 16 June 2010, *Radio New Zealand International* reported that two official Papuan representative bodies had announced they were ‘handing back’ Special Autonomy status to Jakarta, nine years after it was granted. This move was illustrative of the ongoing impasse in the political situation in Papua and its relationship with Jakarta. The situation in Papua arguably has its roots in the 1969 Act of Free Choice when 1,026 appointed community leaders voted to integrate Papua into the newly independent Indonesia. This decision remains contested as the election process was not based on universal suffrage, and the community leaders who voted did so under duress from the military. The legitimacy of the vote was recognised by the United Nations but this was more reflective of Cold War constraints than impartial endorsement. The most recent actions by community leaders are part of this 40-year-old political situation and demonstrate the tensions and dynamics of key stakeholders: the general population in Papua; the Papuan elites; the local, regional and national governments; and the state security apparatus. This situation is rooted in both economic and political aspiration, with significant differences of opinion on each of the two fronts. Why have these issues remained unresolved? What are the major roadblocks and motivations preventing dispute settlement? What are the prospects for overcoming these roadblocks? This paper attempts to carve through the issues to analyse and evaluate the economic and political challenges in Papua, and thus provide an assessment on the prospects for conflict resolution.

Discussion

There has been increasing interest in the current economic and political situation in Papua, Indonesia. This interest is seen in the increasing number of publications on the issue, from international relations scholars focused on conflict management and resolution, to comparative politics scholars focused on state-society relations. It gained the attention of international media outlets such as *The Economist*, *Radio New Zealand International* and *BBC News*, with interest increasing in recent weeks. In the wake

of the protests in Jayapura in early July 2010, discussion on the Papua situation is thus timely.

This paper takes the view that economic and political issues stemming from the contested 1969 Act of Free Choice still reverberate today, and considers significant recent developments in Papua, evaluating their impact on communities there.

One of the central concerns is the increasing marginalisation of the Papuans due to significant demographic changes resulting from transmigration policies implemented from the 1960s onwards as well as inward investment by companies keen to access Papua's vast natural resources.

These economic activities take on various forms, from the Grasberg mine and the proposed Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE) to BP's natural gas plant and significant amounts of illegal logging. Unfortunately, these economic developments lack legitimate and transparent political oversight.

The absence of a robust rule of law and governance ensures that corruption is widespread and little of the vast financial resources generated as a result of the exploitation of natural resources reach the local communities. Alongside this absence are inter-communal tensions between the migrant workers who take on jobs in Papua created by these new investments and those local communities who lack access to adequate education to benefit from these jobs in any significant number.

In addition to the poor availability of education in Papua, there is also a near equal lack of access to healthcare for local communities. It is important to recognise that along with the social challenges, there are physical ones present as well – Papua has a relatively small population, large land mass and a difficult terrain to navigate. Indeed many Papuans live in rural areas; and they have had to make way for many of the new economic ventures. This forced displacement has resulted in clashes not only between workers and local communities but also with the security forces securing the perimeters of these ventures.

Economic development has also affected political developments in Papua. At present Papua provides the largest contribution to the

Indonesian state of any of its provinces but this has not reduced the social tensions that have been present in Papua over the last 40 years. In 2001, Papua was given Special Autonomy status by Presidential Decree, yet after nine years many Papuans do not receive any benefits from this status. As a result, protests occur periodically calling for a referendum in Papua over its relationship to Jakarta.

From the issues raised in this NTS Perspectives paper, it is clear that there needs to be traction on these issues on multiple fronts to reduce social tension in Papua. The major concerns highlighted through this paper are the increasing marginalisation of local communities, widespread corruption, poor access to and availability of healthcare and education, as well as the end result of conflict between the stakeholders.



A Papuan dance group at the Sentani Lake Festival

Recommendations

The proliferation of government bureaucracy without a corresponding increase in transparency and accountability is the greatest challenge faced by stakeholders (local and migrant communities, central government, local and regional governments, non-state actors) in Papua. This paper highlights areas which policymakers need to address to reduce social conflict and promote both political and economic development.

Economic Development

- There is a need for a more accountable and transparent system to monitor the situation between external investment projects, such as the Grasberg mine and the MIFEE, and local communities.
- Local communities need to be recognised as key stakeholders and embedded in the decision-making process much more than is the case at present.

Health

- There needs to be greater investment in the water and sanitation system in Papua to increase levels of access and quality.
- Papua has a disproportionately high number of HIV/AIDS cases (1.03 per cent) compared to the rest of Indonesia (0.17 per cent) reflected across its community. This needs to be addressed with education/awareness campaigns and greater access to quality healthcare.

Education

- Papua has the lowest level of adult literacy (74 per cent) in Indonesia. Greater rural access to quality education and a more transparent system to distribute the funds made available through the constitutional commitment of 20 per cent of budget funds are needed.
- Tracking of spending patterns for disbursed education funds needs to occur to ensure that sufficient funds are allocated to the hiring of teachers and not simply to capital projects.

Governance

- Stakeholders need to engage in discussion of the issues that create social tension in Papua, and consequently plot a way forward that commits all stakeholders to participating in the process.
- The National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) should be allowed to investigate and report on all human rights concerns in all areas of Papua. This should be carried out without delay.



Introduction

Indonesia is a regional champion of democracy through its convening of the Bali Democracy Forum and has arguably the most liberal democratic system among ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members (Freedom House, 2010). However, on closer inspection the legitimacy of the state and its commitment to democracy remain contested in some provinces. Since the fall of President Suharto in 1998, the country has faced many challenges in the transfer to a democratic system, from the United Nations-brokered Indonesian withdrawal from Timor-Leste in 1999 to the Aceh peace agreement in 2005. While these two cases have progressed substantially on the path to a sustainable peace, there remain several key challenges to the status of the easternmost part of Indonesia, Papua.¹

The entire island of Papua is split between independent Papua New Guinea to the east, and the western half, the former Netherlands New Guinea (1949–1962), now part of the Republic of Indonesia. After the area was integrated into the Republic of Indonesia in 1962, it was renamed Irian Barat (or West Irian), and subsequently, in 1973, Irian Jaya. In an effort to integrate the various islands of Indonesia, the first two post-Independence leaders, Presidents Sukarno and Suharto, promoted in the 1960s a transmigration strategy – a policy of resettlement across the archipelago. This policy was an attempt to homogenise the ethnically diverse Indonesian state as a means of consolidating its post-colonial structure. However, there was significant opposition to this strategy as it forcibly resettled individuals and families from one province to another.

1 This paper follows Hedman (2007) in its approach to nomenclature: ‘unless otherwise indicated, “Papua” is used ... to refer to the territory which, controversially, was divided in 2003 to form two provinces (with effect in 2004), Papua and West Irian Jaya (renamed West Papua in April 2007). Under Dutch colonial rule, the territory was known as Netherlands New Guinea, while Indonesia renamed it West Irian (1962–1973) and then Irian Jaya (1973–2001) ... In 2001, Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid announced the name change to “Papua”, subsequently ratified in the Special Autonomy Bill for Papua (Basic Law 21/2001) by the Indonesian Parliament.’

In the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the fall of President Suharto occurred. This post-Suharto period became known as the *reformasi* period, and as part of the democratisation of Indonesia and wide reforms that took place, Irian Jaya was renamed Papua. The region was recently partitioned into two provinces – West Papua and Papua – in a contested move.



Mass civil gathering in Jayapura in July 2010

As argued by many scholars and analysts, the economic and political challenges in Papua are embedded within the Act of Free Choice of 1969 whereby community leaders in Papua voted to become a part of an independent Indonesia (Chauvel, 2006; Singh, 2009). This process was contested because of its lack of universal suffrage, contrary to the New York Agreement (NYA) which established the first United Nations Transitional Executive Administration (UNTEA) to oversee the transfer of power from Dutch to Indonesian control. It was further contested because the Indonesian central government in Jakarta dismissed the Papuan Provincial Council as the majority of members wanted universal suffrage. The Indonesian central government subsequently replaced it with a Consultative Council comprising 1,026 appointed community leaders. These appointed community leaders voted on the Act of Free Choice under heavy duress from the Indonesian military (Braithwaite et al., 2010). As this Act occurred in the midst of the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union saw support for integration of the former Dutch New Guinea into the Republic of Indonesia as a strategic necessity to garner influence in Jakarta. This support was reflected in its acceptance at the United Nations General Assembly.

After the Act of Free Choice, and until the fall of President Suharto in 1998, the representative

of the Indonesian central government in Papua was the military apparatus, the Indonesian National Army (TNI). In response to integration into Indonesia, the Free West Papua (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, or OPM) was formed in 1965 to promote self-determination and secession from Indonesia. In response, the TNI frequently deployed troops on any indications of separatist movement activity (Widjojo et al., 2010). After the fall of President Suharto and the emergence of a democratic system, the TNI was no longer the only representative of the Indonesian state in Papua. The newly democratised People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), which included representatives from the national legislature (DPR) as well as regional representatives and government appointees, issued a decree instructing that Special Autonomy status be introduced by 2001 (McGibbon, 2004). With this directive, Papua's governor, Jaap Solossa, and his deputy, Canstan Karma, led the deliberations in Papua on the drafting of the Special Autonomy law.

However, this status was a contested notion as some civil society leaders saw it as 'divide-and-rule' stratagem by the Indonesian central government (McGibbon, 2004). The Special Autonomy Law 21/2001 established the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) comprising members from *adat* (Indigenous) communities, women's organisations and religious institutions in equal numbers to be elected by their constituencies. While its establishment signalled a new era in governance of Papua, the technical aspects of the legislative process remained in Jakarta, that is, while bills could be drafted in Papua, they were amended and proposed for enactment in Jakarta. Alongside this there were the significant constraints of weak and corrupt local governments as well as historical conflicts between local groups for access to Special Autonomy funds. With this in mind, there were some initial indications that Special Autonomy status was a significant attempt at decentralisation. However, the distribution of funds between Jakarta, the regional government and the two provincial governments has led to a deficit of accountability and transparency as local elites came under pressure to immediately increase the welfare of both local and in-migrant communities. By falling short of the mark, local elites began to rely on established ties such as kinship and patronage to relieve them of public pressure to deliver. As such the governance challenges in Papua relate

to the lack of transparency and accountability across all levels of government.

More recently, with the Indonesian Presidential Instruction 5/2007 on the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua, the Papua region has been receiving wider media attention. Economic development in the region has had many significant manifestations – the Grasberg mine, a natural gas plant, and more recently the potential development of the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE). The Grasberg mine is the world's largest above-ground copper mine and has generated more than half of Papuan Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 1995 and 2005 (Hernawan, 2009). With its natural resources of copper, gold, coal, petroleum, natural gas and timber, it is in fact the most resource-rich province of Indonesia, and there is understandable interest in its economic development.² The mine has been operating under an agreement between the Indonesian central government and the American firm Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold since 1967. This agreement was signed three years after Indonesia annexed the western half of the island but before the 1969 Act of Free Choice. Although the western half of Papua island was a recognised part of Indonesia when the agreement was signed, there is continued tension between the PT Freeport Indonesia which runs the mine and the local communities forcibly displaced by it in the Jayawijaya Mountains. As a result of this controversial agreement, violence continues to erupt, particularly between local communities and the Indonesian military and police forces. The area between Timika and the Grasberg mine at Tembagapura became the most visible focal point of armed violence in Papua in the second half of 2009 and into 2010 (ICG, 2010).

2 As reported by the Central Bureau of Statistics for 2008, the provinces of Papua and West Papua together account for a relatively high gross domestic product (GDP) compared to the national average of 12,404,829 Rp, if mining is included. Excluding mining, the combined GDP for the provinces of Papua and West Papua is below the national average, and GDP for Papua province is less than that for West Papua province. Mining dominates the Papua province economy at 69 per cent, with agriculture coming in at 11 per cent. However, West Papua province is driven by agriculture at 27 per cent, manufacturing at 19 per cent, and mining, oil and gas at 17 per cent (Central Statistics Agency, 2009).



Grasberg mine as observed from the International Space Station

Challenges to Economic Development

The second major economic development, the establishment of the MIFEE – a 1.6 million hectare integrated food production zone where companies will grow, process and package their products – is in the planning stages (Ekawati and Bisara, 2010). The two economic developments along with the smaller natural gas plant have raised questions over land ownership, the employment and health of local people as well as the overarching concerns of economic development and governance. Even though it is the province with the greatest amount of natural resources, the majority of its local population live in poverty. This NTS Perspectives paper analyses the challenges of economic development, education and health, as well as governance and security in Papua to evaluate the current prospects for peace and for its people. It argues that while the protracted question of governance remains unsettled, there will continue to be disparate levels of economic development for different sections of the community and continued tensions between these communities. This paper will evaluate these pressing issues in an effort to determine where progress can be made and chart a path to conflict resolution.

The provinces of Papua and West Papua are notably resource rich yet there are significant challenges to their economic development. The two greatest challenges are physical (great distances, steep mountains, swampy lowlands, fragile soils, and heavy seasonal rainfall) and social (low population density and extreme cultural fragmentation) (World Bank, 2010). However, despite, or perhaps in some cases because of, these challenges, economic development in these provinces has been financially significant for Indonesia. For example, the Grasberg mine has provided tax benefits, royalties and dividends to the Indonesian state to the tune of US\$1.4 billion in 2009, making it the largest revenue raising activity in Indonesia (Budiardjo, 2010). Papua and West Papua provinces also contain the third largest expanse of remaining rainforest in the world (World Bank, 2010) which has resulted in significant international attention in the context of the negotiations within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The nexus between economic development and environmental concerns has led to significant contestation. In this section, the two issues will be evaluated, and the debates and recent developments charted.



Korowai treehouse in Papua

Rainforests, Carbon Credits and Food Production

Recent international attention on the vast natural resources of Indonesia, and in particular, Papua, has come from Norway in the context of the UNFCCC. In an effort to secure the carbon credits produced by Indonesia through its rainforests, Norway entered into negotiations with the government. The governments signed a Letter of Intent to establish a climate change partnership focusing on the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD+).

In the letter of intent the two governments outlined a three-phase partnership commencing with the preparation phase, starting as soon as possible, aimed at designing a national REDD+ strategy, establishing a special agency reporting directly to the President, formulating a collaborative funding instrument, and selecting a province-wide REDD+

pilot. Following this, a transformation phase is planned which will focus on national capacity building, policy development and implementation as well as legal reform and law enforcement, slated for January 2011–13. The partnership will continue into the third and final phase from 2014 which will be the implementation of national contributions-for-verified emissions reductions (Letter of Intent, 2010). While the first phase has not concluded, the provinces of West Papua and Papua are areas worthy of consideration given their vast natural resources, and the need for local cross-sectoral capacity building as noted by the fact sheet on the Norway-Indonesia Partnership REDD+ (Royal Norwegian Embassy, 2010). Of notable importance are the role of stakeholders, and particularly the involvement of local communities, in the decision-making processes.

In the Letter of Intent, as a general principle and approach both governments intend ‘to give all relevant stakeholders, including indigenous peoples, local communities and civil society, subject to national legislation, and, where applicable, international instruments, the opportunity of full and effective participation in REDD+ planning and implementation’ (Letter of Intent, 2010). As a general principle such inclusion is welcome. However, a more formal agreement based around Papuan involvement is needed. Otherwise, it remains a loose agreement, and those affected by the REDD+ agreement will likely face marginalisation. It is important to have continuous local community involvement in the decision-making process right from the beginning to provide a guarantee of the agreement’s legitimacy.

However, this agreement faces a significant challenge with the recent announcement that the Indonesian central government is to develop the MIFEE in Papua. The government is currently mapping out the forested areas because of ‘zoning problems’ (Ekawati and Bisara, 2010). Indeed, local groups are raising concerns over the benefits that they will receive. Septer Manufandu of the Papua NGOs Cooperation Forum (Foker LSM Papua) said that ‘the project will carry no meaning in terms of benefits for indigenous Papuans. In fact, MIFEE will marginalise Papuans in their own land’ (Abubar, 2010). As is the case with the use of natural resources, negotiations will always take place and not always in the best interests of the local population. However, with

greater interaction between the stakeholders, a compromise should be within reach whereby the investment ensures opportunities for the local population as a matter of course in areas such as education, healthcare, and employment opportunities with promotion prospects.

Moreover, the MIFEE development is in its early stages and is by no means the only contested economic development initiative in the Papua provinces. Indeed, with Papua's extensive tracts of forest there are many reported instances of illegal logging. This has arisen as a result of an uncertain political system and the conflicting laws governing the forestry sector creating a grey area where such activities can thrive (EIA/Telapak, 2005). According to Ministry of Forestry estimates, over 7 million cubic metres of timber are smuggled out of Papua annually (EIA/Telapak, 2005). This is equivalent to as much as 70 per cent of the total volume leaving Indonesia illegally each year. The key characteristic of illegal logging in Papua is the exploitation of the KOPERMAS system. This system was originally designed to allow local populations to carry out logging on their traditional lands but was frequently abused. It is a permit system, implemented to encourage local community development and to generate income from small-scale localised logging. However, local elites generate contracts between local communities and investors but rarely keep to their side of the bargain. As a result, the presidential decree allowing the contracts was revoked but nonetheless many such bargains continue to remain informally and are used as a reason to continue logging activities. In addition to this legal gray area, the involvement of military and police personnel, as well as the presence of coordinated international smuggling syndicates and the poor avenues for law enforcement allow for illegal logging to continue (EIA/Telapak, 2005). This brief overview of the illegal logging issue highlights a significant governance deficit and the need to further develop local capacity to address issues of corruption and accountability.

Grasberg Mine and Local Capacities

The two issues of accountability and corruption are also highlighted in the other major investment in Papua – the Grasberg mine. As noted earlier, the mine generates the largest amount of revenue for the Indonesian central government. This revenue comes in the form of taxes and through the government's stake in the business.

In addition, PT Freeport Indonesia reports a sizeable contribution to the local community. However, the key controversy surrounding the mine is over where the revenue generated ends up and the displacement that occurs by its existence and expansion. These together are central causes of the conflict between the mine and the local communities. The agreement of work signed between the Suharto government and Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold guaranteed the latter the right to resettle the local population without compensation and to have unrestricted access to the land and its resources (Soares, 2004 in Braithwaite et al., 2010). Indeed, in 2009 the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) attempted to investigate several shootings but faced difficulties in gaining access to the appropriate people and places. Commission member Nur Kolis complained that access difficulties to the mining site 'created the impression that Freeport was a state within a state' (Budiardjo, 2010).

While there has been historic animosity between the mining company and the local community, more recently PT Freeport Indonesia has allocated funds for local community development. Over the last decade the mining company has initiated a community policy and developed an apprenticeship programme in Indonesia, and through this they have increased Papuan employment from 1,254 to 3,282 employees and trained approximately 1,000 indigenous apprentices in 2009 (Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc., 2010). These numbers are part of a workforce of 28,400 employees and over 16,500 contractors (Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc., 2010: 12) – a total which equates to over 44,900 people. Therefore as a percentage, the local workforce equates to approximately 7 per cent of its total workforce according to company figures. As a result we can see that a vast majority of employees are still recruited from outside Papua. This has given rise to social tensions between local and in-migrant communities.

There are three main issues being highlighted through migration. The first issue is that there is a significant demographic shift in Papua and this has been ongoing since its inclusion into the Republic of Indonesia. This shift has altered the demographics from a 96 per cent Melanesian population in 1971 to 59 per cent in 2005 (Elmslie, 2008). The central reasons for this demographic shift are the need for skilled labour mostly at the

mine and the indirect jobs created as a result of the mine attracting migrants from other provinces. By Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold's own estimates, these indirect jobs amounted to 283,000 in 2005 (Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc., 2006:6 in Braithewaite et al., 2010).


The establishment and subsequent development of the Grasberg mine went hand-in-hand with President Suharto's New Order policy of transmigration. Within this policy the central government resettled Indonesians from densely populated areas to lesser populated areas in an effort to make Indonesia a more homogenous independent state. The main issue in Papua and some other provinces is that while migrants obtain work with good prospects, local communities are largely ill-equipped for the skilled jobs available. Thus, the local population can neither use the land as they once did, nor do they have good employment prospects in the mine or in mine-related services. As such, poverty among the local population has increased. According to the Papua provincial government, around 80 per cent of Papuan households live in poverty, and they have the lowest literacy rate and education attendance throughout Indonesia in 2005 (EIA/Telapak, 2009).

The Public Policy Challenges of Health and Education

However, the communal tensions are not only between Papuans and non-Papuans, there is also notable tension between Papuan communities. For example, the community funds that PT Freeport Indonesia distribute have been targeted at those communities that have been affected the most. The knock-on effect has been an increase in inter-communal violence over access to these funds. In addition to these tensions there is low intensity violent conflict between local groups, which will be covered later in this paper. This section has served to highlight the economic development issues coupled with a poor record of governance which have led to tensions between those who benefit and those who do not.

Water and Sanitation

Indonesia signed the Millennium Development Goals in 2001 through the United Nations in an effort to raise awareness and further encourage development in key areas. Through this process eight areas were identified (see Table 1) and targets were set for 2015. Papua stands out as a region of particular note in the two areas of education and health. It has been described as the least effective province in delivering results on



Ariel view of rainforest in Papua

clean water supply and sanitation. Public Works Ministry's Cipta Karya Director-General Budi Yuwono said recently that the province of Papua only reached 34 per cent of the population with clean water and sanitation, under the national average of 47.6 per cent and the national target of 60.3 per cent (Hajramurni, 2010). Budi Yuwono highlighted the factors which pose a challenge to Papua's ability to deliver as: the province being remote, the poor infrastructure and the management challenges at the local state-run tap water company PDAM. It is important to note that PDAM is responsible for tap water in urban areas, while the local government is responsible for tap water in rural areas.

Table 1: Millennium Development Goals

1	Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2	Universal primary education
3	Promote gender equality and empower women
4	Reduce child mortality rate
5	Improve maternal health
6	Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
7	Ensure environmental sustainability
8	Develop a global partnership for development

Source: UN, 2001

Once again the central issue causing Papuans to have poor access to water and sanitation is not simply the largely rural nature of the area but also a poor governance structure that has failed to provide adequate investment and delivery.

HIV/AIDS

According to AusAID, the rate of HIV/AIDS in Papua is increasing and has spread beyond sex workers and drug users to the general community. In Papua the rate of reported AIDS cases is 1.03 per cent compared with 0.17 per cent for the rest of Indonesia (AusAID, 2010) with similar rates reported in Papua and the rest of Indonesia by the World Health Organisation four years ago (Freund, 2007). The causes for the disproportionately high number of cases are accounted for by mass migration patterns, poor literacy and inadequate awareness (Freund, 2007), and traditional promiscuity related to

tribal rituals of partner swapping (Suryodiningrat, 2008). The latter has been discredited as a view with inherent ethnic bias which serves to sustain current inequalities (Butt et al., 2002). These are compounded by the isolated nature of Papua's population centres – thus the difficulties in providing and accessing government services, in this case, healthcare and support. A case in point is a survey conducted in 11 different locations across Papua with 196 Papuan respondents. The survey found that 81 per cent had heard of AIDS but only 29 per cent could identify a condom. Among rural Papuans, only 8 per cent could identify a condom and not one rural respondent had ever used one (Butt et al., 2002). Another significant finding of the study was that while there was a commitment at the national level, it did not filter down to the regional level where strongly-held beliefs on Papuan culture by government officials curtailed effective implementation of HIV/AIDS programmes (Butt et al., 2002).

This is a trend throughout the health sector and not only limited to HIV/AIDS. Notably the rate of child morbidity in Papua is higher than other areas in Indonesia in line with the overall poor health in Papua compared to other provinces. Treatable diseases particularly pneumonia and diarrhoea, are common causes of morbidity in children. Data from across the region suggests that malaria, upper respiratory tract infections and dysentery are the major causes of childhood morbidity (Rees et al., 2008). For example, in Puncak Jaya district childhood morbidity is about 85–150 per 1,000 live births, with the figure for those under 5 years of age being 30–50 per 1,000 (Rees et al., 2008). However, while the overall health of the Papuan population is disproportionately low because access to healthcare and assistance is poor, there are other factors involved which negatively impact the health of both local and in-migrant communities in Papua. As a result of poor government enforcement mechanisms and company commitment, there are reports that the BP natural gas operations, for example, are not legally compliant with health and safety standards, resulting in the release of toxic waste into the rivers, which has destroyed natural vegetation, and caused deforestation and flooding (Vidal, 2008). This has led to the loss of livelihoods as many communities rely on the land and many have also been displaced as a result (Rees et al., 2008). However, it is important to note that some progress has been made with the natural resource companies on community development

in Papua. PT Freeport Indonesia has invested in a community fund, the proceeds of which have been used for health projects. Essentially what this section has illustrated is that governance in general in Papua is poor and this has negatively affected the people's ability to remain in good health and have access to adequate healthcare even though there are some attempts to invest in the community by the natural resource companies.

Education

According to a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report from 2005, Papua has the lowest level of adult literacy in Indonesia (74 per cent). The factors that inhibit education in Papua are not necessarily poor facilities but rather the human resource element of teachers oftentimes being absent, or regular but infrequent visits to remote areas, as well as poor pay and transport difficulties, which is of particular note in rural areas where infrastructure is problematic. Indeed it is compounded by the low density of population in rural areas and the geography of Papua which together hamper the ability to hire and retain teachers. The Indonesian central government claims the national expenditure on education in 2006 was 102.5 trillion Rp, amounting to 15.3 per cent of total national expenditure (World Bank, 2009). The Indonesian constitution was amended several times and now includes a legal '20 per cent' rule, which supposedly ring-fences this amount of the national budget to be spent on education services. However, West Papua has the lowest share of overall education spending with only 14 per cent for Jayawijaya (World Bank, 2009). Both of these are under the benchmark 20 per cent mandated in the Indonesian constitution.

The neglected role of education has occurred as a result of a weak and poorly regulated government structure and the trickle-down of minimal education funds is testament to that. As described by Mollet (2007), in West Papua, the local government contributes less than 14 per cent and usually focuses the spending on infrastructure which allows plenty of room to spend ineffectively. As a result, government officials can involve the business community in setting up beneficial arrangements that serve their own interests through capital infrastructure projects. According to the Papua Road Map (Widjojo et al., 2010), education in Papua was

allotted a mere 5 per cent of the regional budget. As termed by the World Bank, 'money politics' is strictly for the gain of the heads of legislature who use their power over local budgets to further their own interests rather than those of local communities. However, another instance of how budgets can be spent for personal gain is through the use of the unspent budget for organisational procedures, the breaching of regulations and the manipulation of procurements, which go some way toward explaining the poor educational services and lack of education in the community (Rinaldi et al., 2007). Another example of corruption is that there are instances where the education budget is used to further the interests of politicians to continue their studies outside of Papua (Mollet, 2007). However, there are reasonable arguments to support such efforts as well, if these efforts assist in developing capacity. The central issue being raised around education is that there are limited resources to put teachers in the classrooms, while a significant proportion of the budget goes into capital projects or lost on disingenuous ventures.

Responsibility and Accountability: Regional Governance Issues

In the immediate aftermath of the fall of Suharto and during the subsequent *reformasi* period, informal negotiations were held between President Habibie and the Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society (Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian Jaya, or FORERI). These negotiations occurred between the President and the 'Team of 100', which represented a wide range of religious, social and geographic Papuan communities. However, this meeting signalled the end rather than the beginning of negotiations as their calls for a referendum on secession for Papua were unexpected (Hedman, 2007). Habibie's successor, Wahid, had a more open and accommodating position on the issue of Papua, which saw the renaming of the province from Irian Jaya to Papua. However, there was discontent within parliament and the army with the increasing demands of the Papuan leadership. Consequently, a hard-line policy was pursued by Wahid's successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, after his impeachment in June 2001 (Hedman, 2007). The year 2001 did see the conferring of Special Autonomy status on Papua although that year also saw the President issue

presidential instruction (Inpres) 1/2003 to divide Papua into three provinces. Many saw this as the central government not having any intention of pursuing a significantly new approach in Papua (Mietzner, 2007). Indeed, the situation in the subsequent period in Papua up to the present has largely remained unchanged, which led the 14 June 2010 vote in the MRP, an Upper House of 'tribal' leaders, to reject the Special Autonomy Law 21/2001 (OTSUS) and provide 11 recommendations, which were a comprehensive list of grievances felt by Papuans.

Table 2: Recommendations of the Papuan People's Consultative Assembly (MRP) and the indigenous people of Papua, 14 June 2010.

1	Special Autonomy should be handed back to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
2	Demand for dialogue to be mediated by a neutral international mediator
3	Hold a referendum on independence
4	Government of Indonesia should recognise the restoration of the sovereignty of the people of West Papua
5	International community should impose an embargo on international aid for the implementation of Special Autonomy
6	No need for revisions to the Special Autonomy Law as it has failed
7	Discontinue all proceedings for the election of district heads and mayors
8	End transmigration from outside Papua and impose strict supervision on migration
9	Release all Papuan political prisoners
10	Demilitarisation throughout Papua
11	Calls for Freeport Indonesia to be shut down immediately

Source: *Recommendations*, 2010

Assembly member Robby Aituarauw reflected on the recommendations, the result of a two-day forum held by the MRP and the seven tribal regions in Papua, in the letter sent to the Indonesian central government:

They are tired and desperate, so they came up with these demands ... look at the villages and the conditions of homes. See whether people have been provided with healthcare and education. They have never benefited from these facilities,

so they believe special autonomy has not been effective and should be revoked. (Somba, 2010)



While the recommendations suggested by the MRP were directed at the central government, there has been some 30 trillion Rp in Special Autonomy funds dispersed to the two provinces of West Papua and Papua. Jimmy Demianus Ijie, West Papua legislative council speaker said last year that there needs to be an element of self-reflection and self-criticism, particularly of the provincial governments' incompetence, when evaluating the success of the Special Autonomy status (Hajramurni, 2009). Indeed, as Jason MacLeod (2010) of the West Papua Association notes, the recent protest of 8–9 July 2010 signalled a shift in the dynamics of those protesting. Previously, the groups protesting were the radical independence movement groups, but most recently, non-violent mainstream Papuans have participated, recognising that they too have to get their own house in order. These groups are aware that part of the problem is with the local elites and politicians being the main beneficiaries of the special autonomy funds.

Indeed, as Loro Horta, a former advisor to the Timor-Leste government argued in 2006, the final status of Papua does not necessarily need to be independence from Indonesia. He compared the Papua question with the integration of Goa into the Indian Union where there have not been subsequent demands for independence. He points out three reasons why Goa integrated with the Indian Union successfully – the impeccable behaviour of the Indian army, the immediate granting of autonomy and the preservation of the local status quo. This, he contends, is remarkably different from the policies implemented by

Jakarta in East Timor and Papua during the Sukarno and Suharto periods. However, the subsequent *reformasi* and democratic period saw President Yudhoyono handle the Aceh question, even to the extent of inviting Timorese President Xanana Gusmao to advise him (Horta, 2006). That said, there remains little progress on the issue of Papua and the longer the status of Papua goes unanswered the more likely that mainstream society will see no other option than independence, as evidenced by the recent recommendations and protests in July 2010.

Security, Law and Order

The contested nature of the Indonesian state in Papua has given rise to societal militarisation both with the deployment of Indonesian armed and special forces (Kopassus) and the armed militias of Papuan separatist groups – the West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, or KNPB) and the Liberation Army of Free Papua Movement (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional/ Organisasi Papua Merdeka, or TPN/ OPM), as well as the presence of communal clashes between local communities. The International Crisis Group (ICG) 2010 report on Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua argues that violence rose in 2009 in part because it was an election year and partly due to activities overseas, particularly the establishment in October 2008 of a then tiny group called International Parliamentarians for West Papua (IPWP). This encouraged militant activists to believe that interest in their cause was increasing internationally (ICG, 2010). It should be made clear here that the IPWP does not advocate violence. Rather the militants saw the raising of Papua's international profile through the establishment of a new international pressure group as a key indicator that their efforts were being noticed. The difficulty in attributing the source of violence is that, in some cases, it could be the result of low intensity clashes between local groups but claimed by militant activists (ICG, 2010). However, the ICG report is rebutted by Ed McWilliams (2010) of the West Papua Advocacy Team (WAPT) who asserts that the clashes are part of a wider social movement that is responding to growing discontent with several social issues covered in this paper including population displacement and marginalisation by the Grasberg mine; mass migration from

elsewhere in the archipelago leading to a significant shift in demography whereby the Melanesian population will lose its majority status in Papua; and access to employment, education and healthcare (McWilliams, 2010). Other reasons for shootings or clashes can be found in the extra-judicial nature of the security apparatus surrounding the multi-billion dollar Grasberg mine which is guarded by soldiers and police paid outside of government budgets in an area of extreme poverty (Elmslie, 2009).

It appears that so long as corruption persists, whether it is manifested through the payment of state security apparatus for the Grasberg mine or through local officials siphoning portions of budgets for personal gain, low intensity conflict and marginalised Papuans will remain. There is a particular concern when there is relative disengagement from the central government over the issue of accountability and responsibility in the areas discussed throughout this paper that social disenchantment with the status quo will continue to grow and along with that the idea of a Papua outside of the Republic of Indonesia. These jaded feelings have only increased since the central government agreed to Special Autonomy, and at the same time, pursued the partitioning of Papua into three provinces. Whatever the motivation was for this, the outcome is an increased disillusionment with the machinations of provincial government, as well as the already present disenfranchisement felt by Papuans toward the central government over their low ranking in the national policy consciousness.

Conclusion

Ever since the colonisation of the western half of Papua island by the Dutch, Papuans have suffered from being a low priority item on the policy agenda compared to other areas of Indonesia due to its low population density and its difficult landscape. History has also set it apart from the rest of the archipelago with its Melanesian majority population (before the transmigration policies of the 1960s significantly affected its demography). Since the 1960s Papua has been home to the Grasberg mine which is not necessarily a negative development. However, the lawlessness and bureaucratic incompetence surrounding its operation ensure animosity

with the local communities marginalised by its activities. Indeed the central concern relating to the status of Papua is 'money politics'. If these concerns are to be taken seriously by the central government then there has to be a concerted effort by them to enter into negotiations with the Papuan leadership to chart a way forward. As was illustrated in the recent protests, more people across society are becoming negatively affected by the status quo and are as a result more willing to speak out about it. If the government fails to adequately provide basic services for the people even in the short term while Papua remains a resource-rich area, the continuation of the conflict will be ensured and with that the possibility of secession.

However, if the concerns of the majority are heard and addressed to encourage an outcome acceptable to both sides, then the likelihood of conflict or full secession will reduce. If, on the other hand, Papua continues to suffer from policy inertia from the central government, then the likelihood of momentum gaining across the mainstream of society for secession will continue to rise as has been happening more recently. There are calls by various civil society actors such as Neles Tebay for international mediation in some form to facilitate discussion between the central government and the Papuans. While this may appear unnecessary to the central government, if they are to truly be a regional leader of democracy then they should lead by example and enter into dialogue with the Papuans. As occurred during the Aceh peace process, the mediation of Xanana Gusmao and the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari assisted in finding resolution of the conflict there. It could well be that the Aceh leadership are now in a position to offer their own assistance to the central government in resolving the issues in Papua. Indeed, if the central government were to look further afield, since they are already in negotiations with the Norwegian government on REDD+, they could also seek their assistance in resolving the governance issues in Papua. While these are possible stakeholders and ways forward, it is clear that whichever path the central government chooses to pursue, if it is interested in resolving the issues raised in this paper, then it will need to engage in discussions with those affected by them.

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