

CENS-WARWICK GR:EEN WORKSHOP "COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE STATE OF PLAY"

2 - 3 SEPTEMBER 2013, SINGAPORE

Organised by

S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

THE UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK

With the support of

NSCS
NATIONAL SECURITY COORDINATION SECRETARIAT

GR:EEN
Global Re-ordering: Evolution through European Networks

CENS-WARWICK GR:EEN WORKSHOP COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE STATE OF PLAY

REPORT ON THE WORKSHOP ORGANISED BY
THE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (CENS)
AT THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (RSIS),
NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, SINGAPORE

THE UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK, UK

WITH THE SUPPORT OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COORDINATION SECRETARIAT (NSCS)
AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, SINGAPORE

GLOBAL RE-ORDERING: EVOLUTION THROUGH EUROPEAN NETWORKS (GR:EEN)

2 – 3 SEPTEMBER 2013
MARINA MANDARIN SINGAPORE

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Rapporteurs: Eliane Coates, Joseph Franco, Caitríona H. Heinl, Nadica Pavlovska , Valerie Teo, Jennifer Yang Hui, Yeap Su Yin, Senol Yilmaz

Edited by: Joseph Franco

This report summarises the proceedings of the workshop as interpreted by assigned rapporteurs and editor of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.

The workshop adheres to a variation of the Chatham House Rule. Accordingly, beyond the points expressed in the prepared papers, no attributions have been included in this workshop report.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The workshop brought together international and local academics to share cutting-edge research and best practices to counter violent extremism and radicalisation (CVE-Rad). Seven panels were held from 2 to 3 September 2013 at the Marina Mandarin Hotel in Singapore.

Opening Remarks

At the opening of the workshop, **Norman Vasu** noted the timeliness of the event as violent extremism continued to be a challenge across different contexts. Attempts to counter violent extremism had become more complex with new communications technology and social media. The importance of narrowing the gap between academic output and policy practitioners' needs were underscored. **Stuart Croft** noted the strong relationship between RSIS and the University of Warwick and highlighted that the collaborative workshop was situated within the GR:EEN (Global Re-ordering: Evolution through European Networks) research initiative.

Panel One — The Evolving Threat of Violent Extremism: European and Asian Perspectives

Alex Schmid presented findings of the TERAS-INDEX project that monitored threats posed by foreign terrorist groups to Germany. While Germany had been spared from jihadist ire, conflicts could become portable as diasporas continued to be invested in the politics of their home countries. **Bilveer Singh** focused on the threat of violent extremism in Southeast Asia, specifically Indonesia. Despite heavy clampdowns on violent groups forcing changes to their organisation, these groups remained fixated on establishing an Islamic state through the use of violence. The current state of play for countering violent extremism in a holistic fashion appeared bleak. **Edwin Bakker** talked about the phenomenon of foreign fighters from Europe entering Syria and raised policy questions currently confronting European states on how to deal with the legal and ethical issues raised by these foreign fighters, especially those who have returned from conflict areas.

Panel Two — Non-Violent and Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin?

Sulastri Osman shared preliminary findings from her ongoing field research on interactions between violent and non-violent groups and individuals in Indonesia which were largely gleaned from the funerals of suspected terrorists. **Jonathan Birdwell** presented on a DEMOS study based on groundwork in the UK, Canada, Denmark, France and the Netherlands, which found that emotional appeal, the thrill of adventure, internal group dynamics, spiralling one-upmanship and a perceived lack of alternatives to the use of violence could explain how non-violent radicals turn violent. Promotion of critical thinking and digital literacy were recommended as strategies to discourage the turn to violence. Drawing parallels between Myanmar's Abbot Ashin Wirathu and Indonesia's radical Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, **Farish Noor** argued that the former's popularity was more tied to a political than a religious discourse that framed Buddhist Burmese as victims of alien oppression. Caution was thus necessary to prevent uncritical acceptance of the media's portrayal of clashes in Myanmar as a Buddhist-Muslim issue. **Greg Barton** argued that when non-violent groups helped facilitate violent radicalisation, transparency was required to deal effectively with the underlying grievances. "Allowable" non-violent extremism was a legitimate and necessary aspect of open societies and care should be taken not to conflate non-violent and violent extremism.

Distinguished Lunch Lecture — Future Directions in Terrorism: Challenges, Predictions, and Opportunities for Research

John Horgan spoke of challenges, directions and opportunities for research on terrorism issues. He provided eight predictions on the future of terrorism; each posed its own challenges to the field of study. Among other things, the blurred lines between online and other forms of radicalisation were highlighted, along with the current lack of knowledge about how the Internet attracted and helped sustain individuals' involvements in violent extremism. The limited insights into how the authorities' presence online could result in

disengagement was also exposed. To conclude, it was predicted that online radicalisation would become a routine part of the radicalisation process.

Panel Three — Religion as a Factor in the Radicalisation into Violent Extremism: The Evidence Assessed

Panel Three assessed whether religion was an important factor in radicalisation into violent extremism. **Noorhaidi Hasan** outlined how extremists justified violence through the concept of *al wala wal bara*. **Greg Fealy** dissected the salience of non-religious motivations of Indonesian Islamist militants and stressed that psychological and political factors were more critical in driving motivations rather than religion as commonly assumed.

Panel Four — Behavioural Indicators of Radicalisation into Violent Extremism: Is Early Warning Possible?

Shandon Harris-Hogan focused on The Radicalisation Indicators Model (TRIM) and highlighted potential markers of radicalisation applicable across a range of ideological extremes. **Scott Flower** drew attention to the disproportionate role of Muslim converts in terrorist organisations worldwide. The third presentation by **John Morrison** focused on the quest for a deeper and more detailed analysis of the terrorism phenomenon and posed diverse questions through the analysis of terrorist organisations as heterogeneous groups with a variety of roles and responsibilities.

Panel Five — Online Radicalisation: Myth or Reality?

Panel Five examined whether the notion of online radicalisation was myth or reality. **Muhammad Iqbal** analysed the use of online video platforms by UK- and Australia-based extremist groups and highlighted the interactions between two opposing movements: Islamists versus far right anti-Islamic groups. **Solahudin** focused on two case studies from Indonesia and illustrated how terrorist groups took full advantage of the Internet for propaganda, recruitment, militancy and bomb-making know-how, and fundraising to support their operations. **Luke Gribbon** argued that the Internet's role in the process of radicalisation continued to be difficult to define as evidence gathered from public and open sources had been contradictory and the academic field remained very much divided over the issue.

Panel Six — Countering Online Extremist Narratives: Harnessing the Potential of New Social Media

Omer Saifudeen presented the NSRC Cyber Extremism Orbital Pathway Model, which was based on the hypothesis that radicalisation could begin at the point when an individual started to become sceptical of mainstream thinking. The scepticism could lead to activism and, later, violent extremism. Seeding doubt and discrediting radical ideas were presented as potentially viable tools for counter-radicalisation. **Jonathan Birdwell** spoke about social media analytics and described how initial interest came from corporations interested in product marketing. It was suggested that social media analytics could help understand extremist groups and provide important new understandings for law enforcement. **Abdul-Rehman Malik** presented insights gained from his work in Britain in designing and retelling narratives to counter extremist Islamists. The presentation stressed the need to fully understand the target audience. **Ross Frenett** talked about the importance of networks to counter extremism and emphasised the invaluable knowledge that could be tapped from former extremists.

Panel Seven — Comprehensive Ideological De-Radicalisation of Militants: A Pipe Dream?

Tore Bjørgo observed that radicalisation was a heterogeneous phenomenon and people engaged in terrorism and other forms of violent extremism for a variety of reasons, political and non-political. **Maajid Nawaz** underscored the importance of preventive work against extremism and was optimistic that comprehensive de-radicalisation was both possible and desirable. The micro and macro levels of de-radicalisation were presented; on the one hand, it was necessary to address the reasons an individual joined a particular cause and, on the other hand, it was also important to unpack the narratives of violent extremism. Ending the session, **Tom Parker** pointed out how until recently, NGOs played a much less prominent role in the field of counterterrorism. NGOs tended to have access to a set of policy tools that could complement those of states and international organisations and which could ultimately enhance the credibility of counterterrorism initiatives.

Roundtable: Key Takeaways, Gaps in Research and other Research Issues

In the roundtable session, speakers and participants discussed key insights garnered from the workshop and addressed gaps in knowledge. The roundtable was primed with a brief recap of the key themes that emerged. The evolving threat of terrorism continued to be a foremost concern, particularly the phenomena of foreign fighters and lone actor terrorists. The increasingly blurred lines between online and offline radicalisation was another area of concern.

There was much discussion about the methodology of terrorism research and consensus that even more multidisciplinary studies were needed. There was also greater need to unpack the more down-to-earth reasons behind why some individuals turned violent. It was suggested that lessons could in fact be gleaned from military sociology in which it had been argued that the primary motivation for soldiers on the frontlines were not grand ideologies but rather fellowship with their comrades.

Finally, beyond research methodology, there was also discussion about the actual presentation of research outputs from those in academia to policymakers and frontline practitioners. The assumption that academics lacked access to policymakers was turned on its head when it was asked if academics were actually ready to talk when policymakers required their specific advice. Narrowing the gap between academics, policymakers and practitioners meant constant engagement with one another as well as creative deliveries of research findings.

Closing Remarks

Stuart Croft brought the Workshop to a close and thanked the speakers and participants for the richness of content during the presentations and discussions. **Bilveer Singh** commented on the importance of timely, relevant research to counter violent extremism.

OPENING REMARKS

Norman Vasu

Stuart Croft

Norman Vasu welcomed the speakers, participants, and observers on behalf of the Dean of RSIS. The workshop was made possible by existing partnership between the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) and the University of Warwick, with the support of the National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) and the GR:EEN (Global Re-ordering: Evolution through European Networks) research initiative.

Vasu noted that the workshop came at a time when the challenges posed by violent extremism remained current concerns. While al Qaeda as an organisation might have experienced setbacks, its ideological appeal still retained the potential to stoke violence. Extremist right-wing groups also continued to pose a persistent threat. There might be varied definitions of violent extremism which could pose a challenge for analysis, but there were also opportunities to redefine and refine the concept. Compounding both conceptual and practical issues were advancing communications technologies and the new social media and how they increased the potential for fringe ideas to be widely disseminated,

further complicating efforts by security stakeholders to prevent violent ideas from being translated into violent acts. Fads in CVE-Rad must be avoided and stakeholders should be reminded that initiatives needed to always be defined in context.

The workshop assessed the state of play in countering violent extremism and aimed to bring together academics, policymakers, and practitioners in the field. It was an effort to close the gap between academic output and policy practitioners' needs. Guest speakers comprised representatives from Singapore, the Netherlands, Norway, Indonesia, the UK, Australia, the US and France.

In his opening remarks, **Stuart Croft** welcomed the guests and drew attention to the ongoing collaborative relationship between RSIS and the University of the Warwick. He explained that the workshop fell within the GR:EEN research initiative which was funded by the European Commission. The objective of the GR:EEN project was to analyse various policy areas wherein the European Union could become more influential.

PANEL 1

THE EVOLVING THREAT OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM: EUROPEAN AND ASIAN PERSPECTIVES

The Evolving Threat of Violent Extremism: Islamist Terrorism in Germany in International Context by ***Alex Schmid***

Alex Schmid

Alex Schmid presented the key findings of the ongoing TERAS-INDEX project that monitored threats posed by foreign terrorist groups to Germany. TERAS sought to assess the vulnerability of the estimated 1 million Muslim youths to radicalisation. In 2011, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution reported that 1 percent of all Muslims in Germany were members of at least one of the 29 active Islamist groups in the country. Of greater concern to TERAS were the 21 Terrorist and Extremist Groups listed on its roster.

While the statistics of Germany-linked victims of terrorism between 1994 and 2012 remained low with only 141 reported casualties, Germany however remained a legitimate target for violent jihadis because of German military involvement in Afghanistan and Berlin's close ties to the United States and Israel. Domestically, Germany could be perceived by jihadis as a country that possessed a value system inimical to fundamentalist precepts such as secularism. Nine motivations that could contribute to the growth of home-grown Islamist terrorists in the West were listed: socioeconomic backgrounds, psychological abnormality, individual adversity, conditions in the West, crises of identity, foreign policy, the influence of the Islamic world, the role of religion, and social motives.

Remarks were made regarding how al Qaeda presence in Europe was the least structured. However, while there might be an absence of a pan-regional structure and there was no reliable data on the actual number of al Qaeda members and followers in Europe, the al Qaeda chief of operations for Europe had called for a combination of attacks to "drive the enemy to desperation", damage Western economies, and trigger repressive policies by European states which would ease the recruitment of Muslims into violence.

To conclude, it was pointed out that Germany, despite its visibility in foreign policy, had been spared from jihadi ire. Nevertheless, extremist and terrorist groups active in Germany could still conduct recruitment and fundraising activities. It was also mentioned that conflicts had the potential to become portable with diasporas often still linked to the politics and violence in their home countries. Finally, it was recognised Berlin's foreign policies would have little influence on the de-escalation of conflict in the home countries of such diasporas. Regardless of shifts in German foreign policy, Islamists would seek to continue efforts to contest prevailing secular values and to expand their influence among the Muslim youth in Germany.

The Evolving Threat of Violent Extremism: A Perspective from Asia by ***Bilveer Singh***

Bilveer Singh

Bilveer Singh presented on how violent extremism and terrorism were evolving in the Southeast Asian context. Regardless of changes to organisations and target selections, the region's terrorist groups remained fixated with establishing an Islamic state through the

use of violence. In Indonesia, for example, the current threat had increased as the concept of centralised jihad transitioned into individualised jihad. While there might be intergroup conflict amongst jihadi groups, Salafi jihadi outlooks remained a potent factor that could stoke violence. Analysts concerned with the organisational roles of al Qaeda Central or Indonesian groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) were therefore "missing the point".

What resonated amongst Indonesian groups were broad concepts such as jihad qital (physical warfare), offensive and defensive jihad, and the idea of the 'near enemy'. Threats currently stemmed from small, three- to five-men cells. Violent extremism had in effect become decentralised and de-territorialised. Religious-based violent extremism would further persist in stride with the cost-effectiveness of small-scale terrorist attacks, and such developments would make it increasingly difficult for states to secure their populations. The state of play for CVE remained rather bleak.

In Indonesia, internal factors such as the lack of good governance impinged heavily on initiatives that attempted to address violent extremism. Disillusionment over perceived corruption in Indonesian politics had provided extremists an opening to disseminate their ideas. On the other end of the spectrum, deprivation had made it plausible for some unscrupulous actors to use religious justifications for crimes committed, for instance, to steal money for a supposedly legitimate cause.

In conclusion, jihadism in Indonesia remained in flux and continued to pose a challenge. JI remained adaptable and could be argued to be in a 'JI 3.0' phase. The greatest challenge therefore was to identify holistic approaches against violent extremism.

Evolving Threat of Violent Extremism: The European Perspective – The Phenomenon of Foreign Jihadi Fighters by ***Edwin Bakker***

Edwin Bakker

Edwin Bakker focused on the phenomenon of European jihadi fighters who streamed into Syria. According to estimates, there were around 600 Europeans among the 5000 foreigners fighting in Syria, with a disproportionate number from small countries such as Belgium, Denmark and The Netherlands — roughly 100 foreign fighters for every one million of the Muslim population. Fighters that crossed into Syria were mostly young men of North African, Turkish and Middle Eastern origins. The foreign fighter phenomenon had raised several questions among European states: did fighting on Syrian soil posed a threat to the foreign fighters' home countries? Were foreign fighters' actions in Syria illegal under European laws? The phenomenon of European jihadi fighters needed to be understood against a backdrop of relatively little political violence, terrorism and other types of violent extremism on the continent. The presence of foreign fighters were not new, but there were increasing concerns as the numbers rose from a marginal few only two years ago to their current level in the spring of 2013.

There were various motivations that could spur foreign fighters. For one, depictions of violence committed against children in the Syrian conflict coupled with the militant jihadi ideology had coalesced into a powerful justification to act. The importance of group factors was also a key reason as groups of peers would often travel together to participate in the conflict. Groups of four or five young men, even entire football teams, were lured to Syria with the promise of adventure. The biggest policy challenges for European governments was not simply preventing foreign fighters from entering Syria, but also mitigating the possible adverse effects brought about by returning fighters.

In conclusion, several observations were reiterated and future directions for research were laid out. First was the degree of ambivalence over the threat posed by foreign fighters to European security. The second observation was in relation to the fog of war that hung over such a phenomenon; it remained unclear what the European foreign fighters were doing in Syria, i.e., whether they were on the sidelines or had actually fought on the frontlines and could thus become potential vectors for greater violence once they returned. Third, a wide array of actors from the intelligence and security services, social work and academia were needed to further examine the issue of foreign fighters.

Discussion

Clarification was asked as to why non-violent organisations such as the Tabligh Jemaat wound up on some governments' watchlists. It was argued that security services monitored such groups over concerns that they could act as preparatory organisations where violent extremists could surreptitiously scout for and cherry-pick potential recruits.

The relatively large number of foreign jihadi fighters that came from small states such as The Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark prompted a discussion regarding the interplay between the rise of European right-wing movements and jihadis. A question was asked if the European foreign fighters were going into conflict zones to react against perceived xenophobia or religious discrimination. It was pointed out that there was an apparent correlation, but it would still be too early to draw causation. A related query regarding which Syrian group was receiving the foreign fighters revealed that most Europeans ended up fighting with the Free Syrian Army.

The effects of heterogeneous societies on CVE-Rad initiatives were also discussed. There was consensus that heterogeneity in populations combined with the rapid growth in information and communications technology had allowed for fringe ideas to be propagated more rapidly. Individuals could be exposed now to niches of like-minded individuals where what would had been esoteric knowledge becoming readily available online—such as jihadi ideology. This supports the overarching idea with regard to radicalisation that there are many pathways to violent extremism.

Moving away from describing the phenomena of violent extremism, the European Union's (EU) responses were assessed. Several gaps were highlighted such as the lack of an EU-wide intelligence service. The existence of a small transnational "radicalisation awareness network" was also critiqued for functioning more as a forum rather than an implementing agency. What underpinned the current state of affairs was the prevailing paradigm that CVE-Rad remained a domestic affair for EU member states.

PANEL 2

NON-VIOLENT AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM: TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN?

Dynamics of Grief and Grievances: The Funerals of Suspected Terrorists in Indonesia by ***Sulastri Osman***

Sulastri Osman

To answer the question whether radical activism could lead to terrorism, **Sulastri Osman** presented some of her preliminary fieldwork findings on interactions between violent and non-violent groups and individuals in Indonesia, which were largely gleaned from the funerals of suspected terrorists.

It was noted that the activities of radical Muslim groups, like the religious vigilantes, for instance, were different from those of the terrorists'. While vigilante groups sought to impose their standards of morality among Muslims in the country, the latter intended to overthrow the state altogether. Vigilante groups furthermore also operated in the open whereas terrorist groups tended to be clandestine. However, with recent changing dynamics on the ground, such as the strategic retreat of terrorist groups, shifts in thinking about their use of violence, their adoption of 'popular' causes as a means to build up mass support, and the narrowing of tactics in relation to the use of force and targets of attacks, there were concerns that radical groups could become more open to cooperating with the terrorist groups. Such concerns, however, would lead one to question why there were not more individuals becoming terrorists.

The funerals of suspected terrorists killed in police raids had become increasingly significant events around which the radical fringe would converge. The spectrum making up the fringe included groups like *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI) and other vigilante organisations, *Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid* (JAT) and 'mainstream' Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). They came together, however, less over lofty ideologies and more over a fear that any one among them could be next. Many among them saw themselves as *aktivis Islam*, or Islamic activists, who in their various ways were attempting to carve out greater public space for Islam regardless that they often disagreed over one another's means. Further informing such a fear, particularly for the vigilante groups, were a history of run-ins with the authorities and an existing distrust of the police. Conspiracy theories further compounded the issue of distrust, and the search for signs of martyrdom could not be underestimated as a pull factor.

However, the same fear that anyone from among the radical groups could be the next suspected terrorist targeted in police raids also resulted in deliberate distancing from those associated with terrorist activities, the cleaning up of rogue behaviours among members, and efforts to clearly differentiate their *nahi mungkar* (anti-vice) activities from terrorist activities, even the usual (non-violent) jihadi-related ones. Inter-group competition and rivalries also meant different radical groups would often keep to themselves and become protective of their turf and members, affecting the actual cohesiveness of the radical fringe.

Several preliminary conclusions were offered. Firstly, the radical fringe would rally together as *aktivis Islam* when the occasion called for it. Secondly, there was a need to look beyond surface interactions in order to understand the underlying dynamics that revealed the true nature of these interactions. Thirdly, the role of charismatic ideologues should not be overlooked in the process of radicalisation to violent extremism. Finally, the funerals of suspected terrorist could definitely be opportunistic events for terrorist recruitment, but they also showcased important dynamics at play that helped shed light on why the majority on the radical fringe would not become involved in terrorism activities.

Revisiting the Edge of Violence by ***Jonathan Birdwell***

Jonathan Birdwell

Jonathan Birdwell explained that the Conservative government in the UK had revised the Prevent Strategy and cut funds to organisations that disagreed with British values. Prior to this shift, even non-violent Salafi organisations were involved in countering violent extremism notwithstanding their illiberal tendencies. The Conservatives had also redirected de-radicalisation programmes to the Department of Communities and Local Government. Thus, the assessment of impact of these policy changes had been a top priority. While actual instances of violent extremism made up a much smaller percentage compared to non-violent radicalisation, the concerns remained perceived as a 50-50 split, necessitating the conduct of empirical research to correct such an assumption by policymakers.

DEMOS gathered data on eight terrorist plots and constructed 58 detailed profiles of violent extremists through open and closed sources of information. Also profiled were non-violent radicals through 20 in-depth interviews. Half of the subjects hailed from Canada and the other half from Denmark. They were asked three questions that sought to construct a "threshold model": the separation between religion and the state, the role of religion in law, and the use of force. Focus groups of young Muslims were also used to compare violent individuals with non-violent individuals.

Information gathered related to objections to foreign policy, belief in radical ideas and in dual identity crises had not provided a significant difference between violent and non-violent youths. Rather, the emotional appeal of discourses that comprised of an us-versus-them and an Islam-under attack themes, the thrill of adventure, internal group dynamics, and the perceived lack of alternatives to violence were more significant in explaining how non-violent radicals turned violent.

To conclude, it was suggested that satire could undermine the emotional appeal of violent extremism. Other recommended initiatives included initiatives that recasted other forms of non-violent political activism as exciting, and the promotion of critical thinking and digital literacy.

Captive Audiences and Victimisation Narratives: The Anti-Muslim Rhetoric of Abbot Wirathu in Mandalay, Myanmar by ***Farish Noor***

Farish Noor

Farish Noor argued that Wirathu's popularity in Myanmar could be attributed to a political rather than a religious discourse that framed Buddhist Burmese as victims of alien oppression by the Muslim Rohingyas. He also drew parallels between Myanmar's Abbot Ashin Wirathu and Indonesia's firebrand cleric Abu Bakar Bashir. The current violence in Myanmar's Rakhine State must be situated in the historical context of anti-colonialism and Burmese nationalism. Such a narrative remained potent as Wirathu had secured a pivotal position in Myanmar's religious and educational spheres.

Like Abu Bakar Bashir's network of *madrasahs* in Indonesia, Wirathu's monastery was not just one, but many schools. His main monastery was male-dominated with a set curriculum and regimented routine. This captive audience, cut off from society, accorded Wirathu the status of a cult figure. The monastery offered a perfect environment in which his narrative could be constructed and perpetuated with complete command of the signs and symbols associated with his discourse.

Wirathu often presented himself as a nationalist and was careful to position himself in the context of Burmese politics. For instance, he often posed in front of Aung San Suu Kyi's image. Technologically savvy, Wirathu's followers had access to a platform through which he could widely disseminate his messages which often included the use of gruesome pictures of Buddhists purportedly killed by Muslim Rohingyas.

In conclusion, it was stressed that while Wirathu remained a controversial figure, observers must be cautious against buying into the media's portrayal of violence in Rakhine as a Buddhist-versus-Muslim struggle.

The Limits of Tolerance: Radicalisation and the Contribution of Non-Violent Extremism by ***Greg Barton***

Greg Barton

Greg Barton argued that while the standard logic of countering violent extremism (CVE) was the reduction of violence, the defining of what extremism was continued to be problematic and required an examination of collective behaviours and social movements. Current research on CVE remained aimed mostly at ideology and belief, but it often overlooked the roles of networks and identity. Moreover, the transformation of movements was less well understood along with the radicalisation and engagement of individuals. Both these issues necessitated more emphasis on empirical research.

Emotion and passion were very much part of radicalisation. Far from being rational actors, people – the "normal" as well as the "extreme" – would often make choices based on emotional responses as much as such choices would be shaped by social context and identity. Thus, the radicalisation process could be protracted and would seldom occur in isolation. Online and physical social networks also played very important roles and underscored arguments that pointed out the actual rarity of lone actors engaged in terrorism.

There should be concern about non-violent extremism when ideologies and movements constituted a social and political threat to society and when they facilitate violent radicalisation. Intervention was deemed necessary when the rights of others were infringed through threatening behaviour and intimidation, when lawful rights were transgressed through bullying, and when extremist movements facilitated radicalisation through incitement to hatred, promoted sectarianism, encouraged criminal behaviour, promoted narratives of violent struggles and advocated participation in violence, and aided recruitment to violent activism.

These threats needed to be understood and responded to in a larger framework beyond the bounds of CVE and law enforcement. Transparency in government, for instance, was cited indispensable to address grievances that made extremist ideologies attractive. Pre-emption of attacks presented a great challenge since "allowable" non-violent extremism was considered a legitimate and necessary aspect of open society. Care should be taken not to conflate non-violent and violent extremism. Mishandling non-violent extremism could lead to perverse outcomes and second-order effects that could contribute to radicalisation.

Discussion

The discussion opened with a query of whether the emergence of right-wing groups had an impact on the ascendance of conservative policy in Europe. Intuitively, it appeared logical to associate right-wing sentiments to the prevalence of conservative policy but there remained little conclusive evidence to prove causation as seen in research using social media analytics.

The potential of humour to be used as a tool for countering violent narratives was assessed next. It was pointed out that comedy films such as Four Lions, which satirised violent jihadism could work. However, such films needed to be tailored specifically for the target audience. Such initiatives could become more effective if they emerged from within Muslim communities themselves.

A question was raised to what extent violence could increase the visibility of a group's cause. With Myanmar used as an example, it was asserted that democratisation processes could incentivise the use of violence and provide opportunities to spread propaganda. The turn to violence by a group was a protracted and deliberative process, which did not emerge overnight. This was a distinct dynamic from the decision to commit violence at the individual level, which placed more weight on personality factors.

Capping the discussion were pointers raised on the available policy instruments and laws the authorities had at their disposal to confront non-violent radicalisation. One recommendation was to use the norms of civil society related to non-violence. Such norms could be used to draw certain lines that non-violent extremist groups should not cross lest they could become alienated and considered as pariahs by their communities. A norms-based response was argued to be better than one that was strictly based on laws.

DISTINGUISHED LUNCH LECTURE

FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN TERRORISM: CHALLENGES, PREDICTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESEARCH

John Horgan

John Horgan started his lunch lecture by asking for whom the future of terrorism was important and suggested four possible answers: the responders, the victims, the recruits, and the researchers. Progress had been made in countering violent extremism notwithstanding a tendency to be fixated only on current threats. It was stressed that analysts must neither hide behind the innate complexity of the phenomenon nor in the grey area between the various disciplines used to study terrorism.

Several predictions on the future of terrorism were made. One was focused on online radicalisation and concerns related to it. While there was research on how the Internet could attract individuals to consider involvement in terrorism, there was not enough attention accorded to how the Internet could sustain their involvements as well as how an individual's online presence could facilitate disengagement and de-radicalisation. Also discussed was al Qaeda's continued relevance. It was assessed that the movement still had influence and had not lost its appeal. Current understanding of how al Qaeda functioned as a movement remained incomplete.

It was also observed that since the end of the Cold War, terrorism had become a more hybridised threat and the new normal was transnational threats. Specific weak spots in the West were also highlighted. For instance, the response to the Boston Marathon bombings on one hand showcased the ability of the US to clamp down on and capture the suspects. However, on the other hand, the incident revealed the need for enhanced resilience and a general decrease for risk tolerance in the West.

The uncovering of more sophisticated ways to study motivations and their links to terrorist behaviours were also raised. Other research gaps highlighted by Horgan were the reasons behind reengaging in terrorist activities, proper evaluations of the consequences and effectiveness of counter-terrorist initiatives, and better understanding of the relationship between failed states and terrorism.

Discussion

The impact of achieving political correctness was the first issue raised. Political considerations had very profound implications on how terrorism had been framed as a problem and, consequently, the solutions offered. To address the issue of political correctness as well as subjectivity that could be injected into terrorism research, academics should be forthcoming in separating opinion from analysis and in pushing for greater transparency in research methodology.

Gaps between the outputs of terrorism studies and policy implementers were also explored. There was a sentiment that at times, academic research failed to be seen in the policy circles. It was posited that there should be also a push from the policy side to engage researchers directly. At the same time, it would also be beneficial for everyone involved, whether academics or policymakers, to incorporate evaluation measures into the initial conceptualisation stages of a research project instead of at the end.

PANEL 3

RELIGION AS A FACTOR IN THE RADICALISATION INTO VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE EVIDENCE ASSESSED

How Radicals Justify Violence: The Logic Behind Muslim Fundamentalists' Resort to Terrorism by ***Noorhaidi Hasan***

Noorhaidi Hasan

Noorhaidi Hasan discussed a research project he had been coordinating on the narratives of Islam and political identity. The research, sponsored by the Indonesian National Counter-Terrorism Agency, covered twenty provinces in Indonesia and aimed to fill in the gaps in existing research on the influence of terrorism in the country as part of a response to criticisms for focusing too much on jihadism. A model that referred to a matrix of Islamism was used to distinguish between militancy, radicalism, extremism, and terrorism. Having a map of the various narratives of Islamism in the country could help facilitate counterterrorist initiatives. Contrary to other perspectives, it was determined that terrorism and jihadism were no longer as compelling as a narrative in Indonesia as before.

Conspiracy theories were however very much alive and appropriated into the jihadi discourse, and were often presented as explanations to problems currently besetting Indonesia. The majority of respondents in the research project might not reject the legitimacy of the modern sovereign state, but they did question the government's ability to tackle corruption. Thus, the calls for a change of system was more related to dissatisfaction with those in power and that aspirations to replace the government with a new system based on *sharia* was largely a response to curb corruption. For the majority of Indonesians, terrorism was not acceptable for reasons of illegitimacy and because there was no religious basis.

Other key religious concepts that played a role in the process of radicalisation beside the oft-mentioned concept of jihad were discussed. For example, the doctrine of *al wala wal bara* (i.e., drawing near to what would be good and withdrawing from what could be bad) had the potential to create the cognitive opening in some individuals to become attracted to the use of violence. That could then provide the basis for receptiveness towards the doctrine of *takfir* (i.e., the condemnatory declaration that others who did not hold similar views were non-believers). Together, such concepts could form the justifications for the conduct of violent jihad, suggesting that religious justifiers continued to play an important role in radicalisation to violence, specifically *al wala wal bara*, which could be used to justify intolerance against others.

Such concepts could be appropriated for the construction of a political identity and used for the propagation of an anti-system logic — the rejection of existing political, economic and cultural arrangements. This anti-establishment doctrine was in turn justified by the doctrine of *hakimiyya*. *Hakkimiya* asserted the integration of religion and the state under Islam. For radicals, this doctrine was used to denounce individuals or groups deemed complicit to the prevailing status quo—the Indonesian state. In the eyes of the radicals, failure neglecting to act in defiance of the state was just cause to label an individual a *kafir*.

To conclude, it was asserted that the narrative of jihad had largely been diminished in Indonesia through successful government and civil society de-radicalisation efforts. Indonesia was becoming more stable with a consolidating democracy. Arguably, it was not particularly relevant to talk about jihad anymore for the mainstream Indonesian community.

Behind Religion: Critically Assessing the Motivations of Indonesian Terrorists by ***Greg Fealy***

Greg Fealy

Greg Fealy unpacked the role of religion in motivating terrorism in Indonesia. He questioned the wisdom in relying on declaratory statements made by extremist groups about the importance of religion in motivating their actions. While the overwhelming majority of terrorists ascribed their actions primarily to religious factors, they might not be aware of all motivations working in their minds, or were more deliberately concealing and denying non-religious factors. Religion was a major element in terrorist rationale and motivations, but it was not the most fundamental. Rather, psychological and political factors were more critical. The challenge for researchers was to analytically disaggregate such factors and assess how to separate the various elements.

Academics who would take a religious-centric view often did not give sufficient weight to other non-religious factors. In contrast, terrorist actors very selectively interpret their motivations for violence in a process that was tellingly greatly unobjective. Terrorists would first develop their beliefs and would then later seek justification for them through religion. Religion often offered the detailed moral and doctrinal material for the confirmation and elaboration of those beliefs. Thus, the decision to turn to violence were usually shaped by cognitive and emotional outlooks that an individual already had, and that usually preceded the religious position.

Political and cultural consciousness, particularly the ideals and values that were internalised during an individual's most formative years, were therefore what mattered most in the process of radicalisation. This therefore indicated the great benefits a multidisciplinary approach could have for the study of terrorist motivations.

Discussion

Religion's potential role in diminishing violence was first discussed. As a counter-example to the tendency of conceptualising religion as a radicalising influence, the example of the American southern states was broached. In such places, the presence of a strong religious narrative played a positive role. Such experiences could be mined for best practices in using religion to counter violent extremism.

Related to this exchange, it was asked whether the buttressing of more moderate Salafi strands was a deliberate attempt to reach out to vulnerable individuals in the Middle East. It was pointed out that such initiatives could be effective and that the promotion of moderate strands of religious thought appeared sincere and not mere posturing.

PANEL 4

BEHAVIOURAL INDICATORS OF RADICALISATION INTO VIOLENT EXTREMISM: IS EARLY WARNING POSSIBLE?

The Radicalisation Indicators Model by **Shandon Harris-Hogan**

Shandon Harris-Hogan

Shandon Harris-Hogan's presentation focused on the radicalisation process as manifested in observable indicators. Based on the Australian context, it was noted that the process of radicalisation leading to terrorism was not caused by a single influencing factor. As such, a specific offender profile did not exist. There were however certain identifiable elements in the process which could be used to construct a framework that could help identify behavioural indicators of individuals that underwent a process of radicalisation towards violent extremism regardless of their ideology. Radicalisation as a process of accumulated escalation of behaviour, three key sectors/areas were found to be important regardless of the associated ideological backgrounds of the radicalised individuals: social relations, ideology, and action orientation.

Many individuals became involved with radical groups due to personal or social reasons. In Australia, it was found that these individuals were far more susceptible to being involved in such groups due to close personal relationships, especially family relations. As their involvement intensified, they began to pull away from their normal activities and relationships.

The second sector, ideology, provided the context: the specific language and behaviours from an individual that underwent radicalisation. As radicalisation increased in intensity, individuals began to adopt a strict and ritualistic interpretation of the given ideology and rejected the values of mainstream society. It was when an individual sought change through advocating, justifying or using violence that radicalisation became of particular concern. While most individuals who harboured extreme ideas would not always engage in violence, those who did appeared to only hold a cursory understanding of the ideology they claimed to represent. Those who engaged with radical ideology tended to have experienced relative deprivation and regarded their conditions as disadvantageous compared to other groups. Such was essentially a subjective psychological state, with no correlation with a person's socio-economic conditions.

The final sector involved a person's criminal or action orientation. As the process of radicalisation intensified, there would be an increase in the seriousness of offences committed. In certain cases, a number of individuals were found to use ideology to conceal their criminal behaviour. Among practitioners, there was a growing recognition that intervention was more inexpensive and safer. The ultimate goal was the redirection of an individual before they could commit an act of violence, with ability to recognise behavioural indicators key to the process.

In conclusion, Harris-Hogan observed that in the implementation stage, the wider context of an individual's circumstances needed to be taken into account in order to factor in alternative explanations of a person's behaviour. As the process of radicalisation increased over time, a person's behavioural baseline must first be established in as much detail as possible.

Muslim Convert Radicalisation: Scientifically Testing for Predictive Indicators by ***Scott Flower***

Scott Flower

Scott Flower looked at the role of Muslim converts involved in fundamentalist and radical Islamic networks. Since the 1990s, the numbers of converts involved in such activities had been increasing. While construction of a model for the analysis of convert radicalisation presented certain challenges, the way forward would be through an evidence-based, scientific approach.

One important point raised was the empirical finding that the vast majority of converts were not radicalised; instead, they reported an improvement to their self-esteem, sociability and had a greater appreciation of life in general after conversion. Evidence pointed to the fact that the Islamic conversion rates had increased post-9/11 in a number of countries, particularly in the West. Research in other areas also indicated increased religiosity.

However, there was a clear trend internationally for converts to be statistically overrepresented in terrorism figures relative to those who were "born Muslim." In the United Kingdom, while there were no exact official statistics on conversion rates into Islam, best estimates indicated that there were between 60,000 to 100,000 Muslim converts in the country. This represented 2 to 3 percent of the country's Muslim population; however, converts had been involved in 24 percent of jihadi-related incidents between 2001 and 2010. A total of 14 British converts had been convicted of involvement in terrorist plots. The total number of terrorist plots that involved either American or foreign originated Muslims in the country since 9/11 was 61, out of which 75 Muslim converts and 90 born Muslims were involved. In Australia, 3 of the 6 home-grown plots had involved converts. In France, half of the terror plots foiled had involved converts while more than 10 converts in Germany had engaged in various terrorist-related activities.

There were a number of short and long term issues from these findings. In the short-term, the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam was found to be an explicit strategy employed by Islamic extremist engaged in violent jihad. Al-Qaeda had encouraged conversions for its tactical and strategic advantages. The disproportionate number of converts involved in violent extremism suggested that such a trend could continue. For the long-term, some analysts had argued that the growth in the convert population was of strategic concern as there was no guarantee that the expansion would not threaten security. There were three roles that Muslim converts could play in violent extremism – as participants in domestic terrorist plots, as foreign fighters, and providing ideological and material support.

To study this, there was a need for the creation of a sound theoretical model in capturing the range of different dimension of convert experiences that allowed for comparisons of control and test groups. This could be useful in the production of a range of risk factors that were measurable and embedded within a conceptual framework.

In conclusion, it was reiterated that most converts would not go on to become radicalised. However, the lack of knowledge in this area had often left policymakers and security practitioners poorly prepared. Many counter-radicalisation programmes, for instance, had thus far been more focused on immigrant communities who were thought to be more at-risk, not convert communities.

Radicalisation and Pre-Attack Behaviour: Broadening Our Understanding by Diversifying Our Questions by ***John Morrison***

John Morrison

John Morrison presented his argument for comprehensively understanding terrorist activity through interdisciplinary research. More than behavioural indicators, contextual issues were important in understanding and studying terrorist groups. In studying the trends of terrorism, there was a need to examine the heterogeneity of issues surrounding the individual.

The study of behavioural roles would not be enough for the formation of early warning indicators. Diversifying research questions and angles was posited as important towards understanding radicalised individuals. Here, several questions were deemed especially vital to prevent assumptions from forming. An important question was whether radicalisation was indeed a necessary step in the process towards violent extremism. While many researchers were of the opinion that radicalisation denoted pre-attack behaviour before a violent act was committed, this might not be true in all situations. There had been cases where the first illegal act happened in the midst of a person's radicalisation process.

Further, it was important to consider context, such as the role of influential individuals. Another was geographical context down to the level of neighbourhoods and blocks. Morrison cited the example of those who joined Irish Republican groups in the 1960s in West Belfast, and noted that the people there were living with attacks on their doorsteps and houses being burned down. Consequently, involvement with Irish Republican groups came much faster.

In conclusion, Morrison noted that the area of research should not just focus on the physical context, but should also take into account other forms of influences. Through interdisciplinary research, a greater and more comprehensive understanding of violent extremism could emerge.

Discussion

The role of culture in radicalisation was first broached during the discussions. There was consensus that culture was an important dimension and much depended on local area understandings of culture. Examples of this included religion as a cultural dimension whereby many converts judged Western values as corrupt or theologically unsound; this was seen in many conversion narratives.

Subsequently, it was asked whether a factor for conversion was a yearning for acceptance by the Muslim community. It was highlighted that in several biographies of converts, their newfound religiosity allowed inclusion into new social networks. Through these social networks, individuals' self esteem were improved and they stopped what were considered as negative habits or ways of life. There was however among those who were born Muslims a consideration that converts were more zealous in their views of the new religion.

An interesting dimension was the way converts sought to increase their Islamic knowledge and how some were zealous about demonstrating their religious knowledge. However, a deficiency in religious knowledge was usually the case for those who had been radicalised, making them easier to be manipulated by violent extremist groups. Evidence was also presented that suggested violent action by newly radicalised individuals could be akin to gang initiations to prove loyalty and worthiness.

PANEL 5

ONLINE RADICALISATION: MYTH OR REALITY?

YouTube Radicals and a Process of Reactive Co-Radicalisation: An Analysis of UK and Australia-Based Groups by ***Muhammad Iqbal***

Muhammad Iqbal

Muhammad Iqbal explored if there was a process of reactive co-radicalisation between two groups which he labelled as radical anti-Islamic groups and radical pro-sharia groups. Specifically, he focused on the process of reactive co-radicalisation and examined the YouTube activities of four groups: the UK-based English Defence League versus the Al Muhajiroun network, and the Australian Defence League network versus Shariah4Australia.

For his UK example, Iqbal recalled events that took place in 2009. On 10 March 2009, the Al Muhajiroun group staged a protest against soldiers returning from active duty from Iraq. First established in the mid-90s, the group had been banned several times and underwent successive changes, and was variably known as Muslims Against Crusades and Sharia4UK. The English Defence League (EDL) was established in reaction to the March 10th incidents. The online presence of the EDL was mainly established by followers who uploaded their personal videos, which included footage promoting rallies and protests. In Australia, The Australian Defence League (ADL) was established in 2009 and was known to have connections with the EDL. Despite being less known than the EDL, the ADL had its own official channel on YouTube. Sharia4Australia, like Al Muhajiroun, had its leader deported. The group also had its own official channel which was taken down, but had recently established a new active channel.

Reactive co-radicalisation was described as a process of mutual radicalisation in which two groups reacted to each other's narratives and actions. The formation of the EDL was seen as such a process of reactive radicalisation. This was also the conclusion from the analysis of EDL's videos and the number of mentions to the Al Muhajiroun group and the calls to action against this group. The comparative analysis of the statistics of the videos in the case of the Australian groups indicated that ADL was more reactive, which was not the case for Sharia4Australia. It was argued that Shariah4Australia lacked the credibility and social connections needed, but the ADL lacked authenticity and events to fuel its narrative. And while the ADL was reactive to overseas events, it had a lack of emotional connection.

Future research directions mentioned included the addition of other groups and individuals in Australia to be examined for co-radicalisation dynamics. It was also recommended that the analysis of other online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and online forums be included to supplement research on YouTube materials.

TERROR.CO.ID by ***Solahudin***

Solahudin

Solahudin focused on Internet radicalisation in Indonesia and explained how terrorist groups took full advantage of the Internet for propaganda, recruitment, militant training know-how and fundraising. First discussed was the case of Alex Gunawan. Gunawan was involved in a 2010 bank robbery in Medan, Indonesia and was subsequently killed in a police raid. But early in 2013,

videos of him emerged on the Internet, in jihadi forums. His death had been glorified as martyrdom and was deliberately circulated to stoke enthusiasm for jihad.

The next case profiled the online radicalisation of Mawan Kurniawan. Mawan was a skilled IT employee-turned-hacker who frequently read jihadi websites and participated in jihadi discussions via social media. Eventually, Mawan's online participation was noticed by Islamist groups and he was recruited by a certain jihadi known as Umar to get involved in cyber *fa'I*, or cyber robbery. Mawan hacked into an online investment company and stole USD 700,000, of which a portion was used to cover the costs for a suicide bomb attack against a church in Solo 2011 and finance militant training for jihadis in Poso in 2012.

From these cases it was clear that jihadis had been able to use the Internet for radicalisation, recruitment, cybercrime and militant training. The Internet had been instrumental in the dissemination of terrorist know-how to individuals who had no access to real training camps. On many jihadi websites, training manuals that covered military strategy, small-unit tactics, weapons employment, and bomb making were readily available.

It was easy and convenient for the jihadis to exploit the Internet in Indonesia. Apart from the cost-effectiveness, the Indonesian legal system remained weak when it came to regulating activities related to terrorism online; neither the 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law nor the 2008 Law on Electronic Information and Transactions were adequate. There was also the technical issue of attribution related to where the crime was committed (i.e. *locus delicti*) as most jihadi websites were hosted outside Indonesia. In short, jihadis benefitted from freedom of expression and freedom of the press, an ironic situation wherein groups opposed to democracy were able to take advantage of democratic space.

To conclude, it was stressed that there must be a counter-narrative to extremism on the Internet. Today in Indonesia, Islamic websites remained dominated by Salafis, jihadis and hard-line civil society groups like Hizbut Tahrir. There were almost no moderate sites with the same level of popularity. Secondly, a specific law against hate speech still needed to be crafted in order to specifically address the problem of individuals who incite violence. Finally, to prevent any misuse of a law against hate speech, there should be a "harm test". A harm test would determine whether the speech in question endangered the safety of others. For example, a child who yelled that he is going to kill a friend who took his toy would fail the test. On the other hand, possession of actual capability to incite violence, such as an influential cleric who ordered his followers to kill kafir would be stopped by an anti-hate speech law.

Exploring Pathways to Violent Extremism in the Digital Era by ***Luke Gribbon***

Luke Gribbon

Luke Gribbon presented on aspects of the project "Radicalisation in the Digital Era", which focused on the claims from the policy and academic literature made regarding the role of the Internet in radicalisation. Gribbon first provided the context and the rational for the study. Next, the research hypotheses were juxtaposed to the available evidence. Finally, some policy recommendations were provided.

The Internet had enabled access to much of the world's knowledge, but it also made it easier for extremists to seek out like-minded people and enable new relationships and connections. The Internet also had a tendency to lower the threshold for engagement in risky behaviour because of its apparent security, accessibility, and anonymity. The Internet, specifically tools such as Google Earth's Street View, cloud computing, encrypted mobile phone voice and SMS apps, torrents and Darknets also provided terrorists a plethora of means for target reconnaissance and attack planning. The availability of technology that could be exploited for attacks was in addition to terrorists' increased usage of social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, and YouTube.

On a positive note, tracking terrorist activities in cyberspace was possible by tracing their online footprints. However, although terrorist activities online could be collected and evidenced, a key challenge remained and it was related to attempts to get a clear understanding of how online interactions and networks could shape the ideas and beliefs of violent extremists.

Several hypotheses derived from a literature review were forwarded and then later tested with data collected from 15 case studies. The hypotheses were: the Internet could create more opportunities for individuals to become radicalised; the Internet could accelerate the process of radicalisation; the Internet could act as an echo chamber for extremist sentiments; and the Internet could allow for radicalisation to occur without any physical contact.

Several findings and recommendations were gleaned from the data. Firstly, the Internet had enhanced opportunities for individuals to become radicalised and it was necessary to make use of available data on vulnerable individuals in intervention programmes to understand their use of the Internet. Secondly, the Internet enabled rather than accelerated the process of radicalisation. Thus, police and multi-agency partners must be provided more education and training on the role of the Internet in the process of radicalisation. Thirdly, in most but not all cases, the Internet acted as an echo chamber where individuals could create, experience and navigate online spaces that reinforced their worldviews. Thus, there was a need to understand the formation of individuals' motivations through the online space. Only then could governments assess the positive impact of online counter-narratives. Finally, most cases of radicalisation involved offline contacts who had played a pivotal role in the radicalisation of an individual. Hence, it was suggested that a whole-of-community approach needed to be applied that included stakeholders outside of the security sector.

Discussion

Seizing upon the link between online and offline, a question was raised whether arrested terrorists' bookshelves were catalogued as part of investigations. It was posited that what violent extremists read on paper might have affected the impact of online media and vice-versa. It was revealed that in some investigations, books and printed materials were indexed as part of police procedure but were not being undertaken in a systematic fashion. The more common practice was for investigators to take one or two photographs of such shelves without any detailed archiving.

The efficacy of YouTube in co-radicalisation was questioned, with an argument raised regarding how other online social media platforms such as Twitter could provide greater interactivity between opposing groups. One example was the spat between the al Shabaab and EDL over Twitter. The point of looking at the online ecology surrounding extremists groups was also raised. One important caveat revealed in the discussion was how YouTube videos constituted only a fraction of the data that could be analysed with comments and "suggested video" lists facilitating networks as a second-order effect of posting videos.

PANEL 6

COUNTERING ONLINE EXTREMIST NARRATIVES: HARNESSING THE POTENTIAL OF NEW SOCIAL MEDIA

Presentation on the NSRC Cyber Extremism Orbital Pathways Model by ***Omer Saifudeen***

Omer Saifudeen

Omer Saifudeen began by providing an overview on the status quo of knowledge on radicalisation processes. Current pathway models mostly focused on radicalisation in the physical world. While the physical and the online world overlapped in many ways and insights gained could be applied to both, there were a few unique aspects of online radicalisation processes that required consideration. First, netizens processed and responded to information differently. Second, parts of the Internet had a unique structure and culture and offered an ideal place for thriving counter-cultures. Third, there was not just one but multiple points of influence at varying levels. Finally, so-called Web 2.0 offered new ways for the consumption and production of information.

Therefore, a new model taking into account such factors was needed to understand online radicalisation. Subsequently, the Cyber Extremism Orbital Pathway Model was presented, of four concentric circles, with the innermost being a sphere where extremists took up violence. According to the model, an individual's path towards violence would begin with doubting mainstream thinking. It was that doubt that pulled the individual to the Scepticism Orbit, where upon coming across strong influencers, the individual could get pulled to the next inner circle, the Activism Orbit, and finally the Extremism Orbit.

A possible way to counter online radicalisation could consist of reversing the radicalisation process by doubt-seeding and discrediting ideas of radicals. Four steps needed to be taken. Firstly, the ideas that were spread to make people doubt the mainstream thinking needed to be identified. Secondly, the narratives needed to be analysed through discourse analysis. Thirdly, ideas that could make people doubt the extremists' ideas needed to be communicated. Finally, other non-direct disabling approaches needed to be taken to neutralise extremist hubs.

In conclusion, it was suggested that future online radicalisation research must include consideration of three fields of study: patterns of cognition, developments of the cyber eco-system, and ideological narratives. Furthermore, there was a need to understand the patterns of Web 2.0 communication and what kind of messaging works, as well as the proper collection of data on Web 2.0 behaviour.

Making the Most of SOCMINT by ***Jonathan Birdwell***

Jonathan Birdwell

Jonathan Birdwell talked about DEMOS' interest in social media analysis, which was prompted by the Egyptian revolution centred on Tahrir Square. While many observers believed that social media played an important role in helping to organise the mass protests in Egypt, there was scepticism over how influential the

use of Twitter and other online platforms were. At that time, there were only anecdotes but no systematic way of studying the influence of social media.

The interest in social media analytics grew primarily out of the requirements of the corporate world as companies were interested in how people discussed their products online. Therefore, they were the initial tools developed by people interested in marketing. Since social scientists were not involved in the development process, many of these tools would not meet the accepted standards of methodological rigour and might disregard ethical considerations.

For political and social scientists, social media analytics offered new avenues to study segments of society. For example, extremists recognised the value of social media to reach out to like-minded people and the wider public. While that was highly problematic, social media analytics also allowed researchers and governments to study and understand extremists group. In the past, the only avenues to study such groups were through infiltration or interviews with disgruntled members. But thanks to social media analytics, important insights into the ecology of groups could be observed and subsequently used to counter them. For example, it could be ascertained which members only partook in online activism and who would actually travel 200 miles to participate in a protest organised by like-minded extremist in another city. Such knowledge could help, for example, the police calculate how many officers could be needed to secure a rally venue.

Three challenges of social media analysis were presented: technological, legal and ethical. Firstly, natural language analysis posed a technological challenge. Language use would change constantly and at times, tweets did not reflect attitudes at all. Also, people would create fake accounts that must not be included in the analysis. Furthermore, the algorithms necessary for the analysis needed to be taught and updated constantly. Moreover, the tools researchers had access to were often not as sophisticated as the tools used by corporations. Secondly, the legal framework thus far allowed for the analysis of social media content when privacy could be reasonably expected. However, attitudes of the public continued to change and a broader public debate on privacy rights was needed. Thirdly, ethical challenges appeared when people might have expectations of privacy even though legally the use of specific content posted online was public.

The presentation concluded that a great deal of information could be gained through social media analysis and the approach offered new ways for social scientists to conduct research. However, social scientists needed to be involved in the development process of software tools so that ethical and methodological standards were met.

In the Land of the Blind, the One-Eyed Man is King: Constructing "Counter Narrative" from the Ground Up by ***Abdul-Rehman Malik***

Abdul-Rehman Malik

Abdul-Rehman Malik presented on his experiences from Britain of creating narratives to counter radical Islamists. It was stressed that the use of the term counter-narrative in itself ceded legitimacy to extremist groups. It presupposed that violent extremists had a compelling narrative to begin with that required countering. It would therefore be more prudent for stakeholders to immediately dismiss the narrative offered by extremists as unworthy of being considered as an equal force in a discursive contest.

Five concise considerations were offered to guide attempts to create and communicate narratives. First, in order to spread a narrative, it was important to understand the audience. In the case of the Radical Middle Way, its efforts were focused on Muslim youths in Britain. This task however was not easy since, as in the quoted words of a social worker, Muslim youths in Britain consumed all kinds of videos ranging from jihadi clips, pornography, dog fights and religious chanting.

Next, religious ideas needed to be harnessed to counter radical religious ideas. This included exposés of the lack of religious teaching credentials of purported scholarly jihadis. Thirdly, Muslims in Britain needed to be understood as part of the global *ummah*, rather than merely a minority in the UK. Fourth, to be able to measure success, evaluation needed to be part of any outreach programme. Finally, a wide axis of engagement containing activists, scholars, and the civil society was needed for counter-narratives.

Unusual Stakeholders in the Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism by ***Ross Frenett***

Ross Frenett

Ross Frenett began his talk by a recounting of how the Against Violent Extremism (AVE) network included the daughter of the victim of an IRA attack as well as the former IRA terrorist who planted the bomb used in the attack. Furthermore, there were former members of criminal gangs, right-wing and radical Islamist groups. The objective of the AVE network upheld to this day was to connect people of different backgrounds who had moved away from their extremist activities in the past and were currently involved in countering those groups and ideas. It was pointed out that counter-extremists had a great advantage over extremists as they had readily come together and expressed eagerness in the sharing of experiences and best practices. One counter-extremist organisation might have developed an expertise in outreach activities that could help other organisations. Extremists, however, did not learn from one another. A right-wing extremist would not meet with a radical Islamist to learn from his experience of how to organise rallies.

For example, the AVE managed to bring together a UK organisation that just began work to help right-wing radicals to exit their organisations with a well-established organisation from Sweden that was active in the same field. Just by connecting these two organisations and at no costs whatsoever, the inexperienced UK organisation was able to learn from the Swedish organisation, avoid pitfalls, and climb up a few ladders at once. This matchmaking extended also to funding opportunities. It was difficult for small and unknown organisations to find the necessary funding for their projects. In this context, the network was able to connect those who needed financial resources to organisations that funded projects.

Discussion

The discussion elicited a question on what was the best approach to frame counter-narratives. It was stressed that counter-narratives needed to be very subtle. For instance, seeding doubts in the veracity of statements of jihadis could be communicated into questions such as "had you thought about the effects on your mother, should you engage in violent acts?" Another tack was to tell stories about people who, for example, went to Syria to take part in the civil war and returned disillusioned and disappointed in how supposed "brothers" treated each other.

The discussion then evolved to what extent governments should be involved in spreading counter-narratives. It was pointed out that governments could intervene based on the prevailing context, with priority given to actively falsify and rectify rumours and conspiracy theories. Of course, the caveat was that any response needed to be calibrated. For some segments of the population, any communication from government sources would always lack credibility regardless of the content and delivery. Thus, it was recommended that government communication should have as light a footprint as permissible. Any government engagement in communications should also be made as transparent as possible.

PANEL 7

COMPREHENSIVE IDEOLOGICAL DE-RADICALISATION OF MILITANTS: A PIPE DREAM?

Dreams and Disillusionment: Engagement in and Disengagement from Militant Extremist Groups by ***Tore Bjørgo***

Tore Bjørgo

Tore Bjørgo observed that radicalisation was a heterogeneous phenomenon. People engaged in terrorism and similar forms of violent extremism for a variety of reasons, political or non-political. Individuals involved in terrorism often came from a diversity of social backgrounds and had undergone rather different processes of violent radicalisation.

Therefore, radicalisation was a dynamic process. During their extremist careers, some individuals had changed their positions and worldviews, and moved toward or away from terrorist engagement as a form of a continuum. Someone who started out being apolitical might become highly politicised and ideological. A follower might become a leader, while a marginalised individual could become socially integrated into society. Another continuum could be seen when a person joining an extremist group in search of action and excitement might become mellow with age or burn out due to constant pressure and exhaustion.

When it came to prevention and intervention measures, one size would not fit all. A more dynamic typology of participants in militant groups based on dimensions that represented dynamic continuums rather than static positions must be considered. The typology might be used as an aid to develop more specific and targeted strategies for prevention of violent radicalisation and facilitation of disengagement, with the diversity and specific drivers behind different types of activists taken into account.

Disillusionment was presented as the main reason for disengagement from terrorism. The frequent failure of militants to achieve what they expected or dreamed about was usually the source of disillusionment, and subsequently, a main reason to disengage from violent extremism. For instance, those who joined the movement for reasons of friendship, communal belonging, identity, comradeship and protection might become disillusioned with the failings of the leaders or bad relations within the group. The mundane reality of being a terrorist might also be the source of disillusionment for those who joined in search of adventure, action and excitement.

To conclude, it was stressed that disengagement was far from being a simple reversal or mirror-image of the initial process of engagement in militant extremism. What brought members into militant groups in the first place might or might not be the same as what would sustain their continued involvement. A better understanding of the processes causing disillusionment for different types of militant activists might offer possibilities for reinforcing these processes and facilitating a higher rate of individual disengagement from extremist groups and activities.

Comprehensive Ideological De-Radicalisation of Militants by ***Maajid Nawaz***

Maajid Nawaz

Maajid Nawaz discussed the possibility of comprehensive de-radicalisation of violent extremists. The role of former radicals in the spectrum of de-radicalisation was highlighted and it was stressed that they formed a crucial part of the solution against radicalism. It was observed that there were different pathways to extremism. Therefore, it would not be helpful to suggest that there was only one way into radicalisation or one way out of it. De-radicalisation efforts should be a two-way street. Policymakers needed to find ways to address extremist grievances and identity crises. The mainstream society also needed to deal with its own discomfort to accommodate the former militants.

There was a requirement for policymakers to challenge the negative propaganda put out by extremist ideology. De-radicalisation efforts might be targeted at different levels of intensity of extremist ideology. The first level was disengagement with violent ideology. The concept of ceasefire or cessation of declaration of war against the state was inherent at this level. It was noted that when talking to jihadis the historical and theological precedents found in Islamic thought related to the concept of ceasefire resonated with most militants. Hence, disengagement could be attained. However, policymakers must not confuse the temporary respite of ceasefire for the putting aside of violent ideology as disengagement might be utilised by some extremists as a military strategy.

The second level was that of de-radicalisation. There should be two goals at this level. The first was the disavowal of the theory of violence. Policymakers needed to convince extremists that violence was not the best way to bring their cause forward. There was also the need to make them believe in a different way to bring about the change. The second goal was the shedding of extremist cause. Such an endeavour did not mean shedding the religion itself. The extremists, however, should be convinced against the rhetoric of dehumanising others.

Finally, counter-extremism should be achieved as the final level. That meant the involvement of the public in challenging extremist theory of violence or methods by the former radicals against would-be extremists. Policymakers must be cautious against equating "good" Muslims with those who were willing to denounce their faiths, as there was virtually no extremist who would choose apostasy over de-radicalisation. In a similar way, policymakers must not prefer one denomination of the faith over another as it would only stoke sectarian conflict while allowing the status of the segment it opposed to rise.

To conclude, comprehensive de-radicalisation was both possible and desirable. However, the process was not efficient and more preventive work against extremism was needed. On a micro level, de-radicalisation must address the reasons an individual chose to join or leave a particular cause. However, on the societal level, narratives of violent extremism must be addressed. Therefore de-radicalisation must take place on both the micro and macro levels.

Fighting Fire with Water: NGO and Counter-Terrorism Policy Tools by ***Tom Parker***

Tom Parker

In his presentation, Tom Parker observed that until recently NGOs played a much less prominent role in the field of counterterrorism. The role of NGOs had increased in the age of 'franchise terrorism': loose networks that invoked a common goal and narrative but relied on local resources and the sympathy of the population. NGOs tended to have access to a set of policy tools that complemented those of states and international organisations, and derived from the credibility and independence that NGOs could bring to counterterrorism. Three social science concepts that could aid civil society groups and had an impact within a containment framework were put forth: complicit surround, semantic infiltration and information symmetry.

The concept of complicit surround was based on the notion that terrorist groups depended on the support

of some parts of the population and therefore needed to pay close attention to the views of their constituents. Civil society groups were often in direct competition with extremist elements for the hearts and minds of marginalised and disadvantaged elements of society. Universal human rights norms articulated by civil society groups could counteract the legitimising frames of religion, Marxist orthodoxy or national pride used by terrorist groups.

Semantic infiltration, on the other hand, was used as description of the process by which one side in an antagonistic relationship imposed its vocabulary and consequently, its paradigm, upon the other party in a surreptitious fashion. The example cited was how US State Department officials found themselves using the language introduced by their Communist counterparts to describe points of contention in such a way that their own political stance was undermined. For instance, the Soviets used terms like "national liberation movements" for surrogate forces it supported in debates over decolonisation and nuclear disarmament. In this way, the Soviets were able to secure tacit legitimation from the American side—this effectively imbued their policy positions with moral force. In a similar manner, the promotion of human rights language and values in communities from which terrorists sought to draw support; civil society groups could reshape the linguistic and political landscape in which terrorist groups operated.

Creating an environment of information asymmetry, or the removal of competing narratives, could be created within the counterterrorism framework. Terror groups operated on the notion of the dehumanisation of 'the other' as the precursor to the sustained use of lethal force against a foe. The victimhood narrative presented by many terrorist groups might be a powerful trope, but they also opened up space for contesting perspectives.

In conclusion, it was highlighted that NGOs had credibility derived from years of advocacy in communities that governments often lacked. They were accordingly well placed to address the information deficit under which terrorist narratives could thrive through the promotion of universal values to which they themselves subscribe and through putting a human face on the victims of terrorist violence. NGOs also possessed a great deal of experience in public education and raising awareness.

Discussion

The discussion session pondered over the question of the possibility and effectiveness of de-radicalisation. De-radicalisation entailed different stages and these stages were loosely connected processes that did not follow specific sequences. The most important consideration for the society was for the radicals to stop their engagement. De-radicalisation programs were often either too ambitious or unclear about their goals. There was a need for these programs to be more modest in their expectations. It was generally agreed that radicals might or might not give up their ideological goals. It was also less important, but they should at the very least stop promoting violence.

The discussion also questioned how governments could play a lighter role in counterterrorism. It was agreed that there was a greater role for the civil society and NGOs in developing responses to the challenges of de-radicalisation. For instance, Amnesty International was involved in campaigning for the release of terrorist detainees in Egypt. In short, de-radicalisation needed to be holistic and needed to involve the entire spectrum of society.

The discussion concluded with some suggestions on which key areas policymakers needed investments to significantly succeed in de-radicalisation. First, civil society and grassroots organisations should be empowered to develop their own responses and capabilities to the challenges of de-radicalisation. Two areas that showed promise in terms of potential de-radicalisation initiatives were community policing programmes, which could bridge the gap between the establishment and the marginalised groups, and human rights. The caveat was that civil society appeared to have not kept up with the debate on de-radicalisation and indeed, might not be keen to be involved in de-radicalisation initiatives.

It was also reiterated that policymakers should move from solely concentrating on one simple measure when it comes to de-radicalisation. Nine preventive mechanisms were offered for de-radicalisation: establishment of norms against violence, reduction of root causes that

could lead people to terrorism, deterrence of terrorists through negative sanctions, disruption of attacks, protection of vulnerable targets, reduction of attack consequences, reduction of incentives for terrorist attacks, elimination of the capacity of potential terrorists to carry out attacks, and disengagement of individuals or groups from terrorism. It was nevertheless noted that if policymakers only employed some of the nine mechanisms, they risked being heavy-handed in their de-radicalisation initiatives.

ROUNDTABLE

KEY TAKEAWAYS, GAPS IN LITERATURE AND OTHER RESEARCH ISSUES

The roundtable session saw speakers and participants highlight key insights, address gaps in the literature and draw conclusions from the workshop. The roundtable was primed with a short recap of the key themes that emerged. There was an impression across the different presentations that the evolving threat of terrorism, specifically the phenomena of foreign fighters and lone actor terrorists, had increasingly become one of the foremost concerns for states. Another theme was the need for multidisciplinary endeavours in conducting rigorous research. The workshop also found that a blurred line existed between online and offline radicalisation, with the cyber dimension contributing to extreme complexity. Technology was also offered to make sense of the discourse of violent extremism. Methods such as semantic analysis, text mining and image analysis could be greatly enhanced by information technology.

The succeeding discussion brought with it a broad array of questions and possible recommendations for the triad of researchers, policymakers and frontline practitioners. A key issue revolved around the analytical utility of lumping together different kinds of violent extremists – from the jihadis and neo-Nazis to the dissidents – for the creation of robust analyses. There was an opinion that that there were crossovers of processes that could usefully explain what could bring individuals into or out of violent groups notwithstanding their culturally specific contexts. A common thread that tied the separate groups together was related to the issues of identity and belonging.

Having said that, tailor-made interventions needed to resonate with the level of abstraction (i.e. individual, group or movement) where policymakers chose to intervene. Balancing out this context-driven approach was the need to enhance academic rigour in theorising about terrorism — the application of scientific method where applicable. On a related front, a deep analysis of ideology could help unearth different veins of a presupposed monolithic ideology.

Aside from research methodology, there was consensus in the room of presenting research to policymakers and making sure that the potential for CVE was realised. Having an excellent programme manager could bridge the gap between academics and policymakers. Prompt delivery of outputs such as one-page briefs in a timely fashion could appropriately demonstrate the value of creatively packaging academic research.

Turning back to the issue of theoretical front, it was pointed out that while there might never be one theory of terrorism, a systematic framework could be obtained from other theories used to explain violence. CVE-Rad could be approached through the discipline of conflict resolution. Specifically, it must be stressed that terrorism as a tool had only worked in conjunction with other means such as political struggle. Thus, a way to sap the attraction of terrorism was to empower personalities of similar stature and charisma the likes of Vaclav Havel and Nelson Mandela.

In similar fashion, there was a greater necessity to unpack the more down-to-earth reasons why individuals become violent and how imagery could tap into emotions and facilitate feelings of comradeship and adventure. One lesson that could be applied to terrorism research could come from military sociology, wherein it had been argued that the primary motivation for soldiers on the frontlines to keep on fighting were not grand ideologies but the bonds of fellowship with their comrades.

Prior discussion regarding the timeliness of research was revisited by an exchange of views of how to get around delays and blockages. One recommendation was to empower civil society as a way to counteract the tendency of politics to trump good evidence. There was

even a suggestion to cut out the policymakers in the process. Doing such however required alternative funding sources, pointing to the desirability of linking up with private corporations. Similarly, CVE-Rad organisations might consider leveraging on crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter.

These issues were linked to the shortening time frames accorded to think tanks in terms of their ability to churn out timely research products. Research must be conducted with multiple points of intervention. It would not suffice to finish a one- to two-year research and to produce a report. Think tanks and researchers must become savvy and disseminate developments in their research as often as permissible so that they could influence debate and policy.

On a final note, the common assumption that academics lacked access to policymakers was flipped on its head when it was asked if academics were actually ready to talk when policymakers required their specific advice. A further challenge for researchers was in remaining relevant when bombs were no longer going off. At the same time, researchers were also exhorted not to be fixated with bottom-up terrorism but to also explore the relationship between state and non-state terrorism.

CLOSING REMARKS

Stuart Croft brought the workshop to a close by thanking the speakers, participants and observers for the richness of content during the presentations and discussions. **Bilveer Singh** commented on the importance of conducting current and relevant work to counter violent extremism. Both also highlighted how the joint efforts of CENS and the University of Warwick exemplified the collaborative approach necessary for successful CVE-Rad initiatives.

WORKSHOP AGENDA

Monday, 2 September 2013
(Day 1)

0800 – 0845hrs **Registration**
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom Foyer, Level 5,
Marina Mandarin Singapore

Attire:
Smart Casual
(Long-sleeved shirt without tie)

0845 – 0900hrs **RSIS Corporate Video + Welcome Remarks** *by* **Norman Vasu**, *Senior Fellow and Deputy Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS, NTU* and ***Stuart Croft**, Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Research) University of Warwick*
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom, Level 5

0900 – 1030hrs **Panel One: The Evolving Threat of Violent Extremism: European and Asian Perspectives**
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom, Level 5

Chairperson:
***Ralf Emmers**, Associate Professor, Multilateralism & Regionalism Programme, RSIS, NTU, Singapore*

Speakers:
The Evolving Threat of Violent Extremism: Islamist Terrorism in Germany in International Context *by* ***Alex Schmid**, Visiting Research Fellow, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, Leiden University, The Netherlands*

The Evolving Threat of Violent Extremism: A Perspective from Asia *by* ***Bilveer Singh**, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS, NTU, Singapore*

Evolving Threat of Violent Extremism: The European Perspective - The Phenomenon of Foreign Jihadi Fighters *by* ***Edwin Bakker**, Director, Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism (CTC), Leiden University, The Netherlands*

Q & A

1030 – 1040hrs **Tea Break**
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom Foyer, Level 5

1040 – 1230hrs **Panel Two: Non-Violent and Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin?**
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom, Level 5

Chairperson:
***Stuart Croft**,*
Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Research), University of Warwick, UK

Speakers:
Dynamics of Grief and Grievances: The Funerals of Suspected Terrorists in Indonesia *by* ***Sulastri Osman**, Research Fellow and Coordinator, Radicalisation Studies Programme, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS, NTU, Singapore*

Revisiting the Edge of Violence *by* ***Jonathan Birdwell**, Head of the Citizens Programme, DEMOS, UK*

Captive Audiences and Victimisation Narratives: The Anti-Muslim Rhetoric of Abbot Wirathu in Mandalay, Myanmar *by* ***Farish Noor****, Associate Professor, RSIS, NTU, Singapore*

The Limits of Tolerance: Radicalization and the Contribution of Non-Violent Extremism *by* ***Greg Barton****, Herb Feith Research Professor for the Study of Indonesia, School of Political and Social Inquiry, Faculty of Arts, Monash University, Australia*

Q & A

1230 – 1310hrs **Distinguished Lunch Lecture: The Future of Terrorism**
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom, Level 5

Chairperson:
Norman Vasu*, Senior Fellow and Deputy Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS, NTU, Singapore*

Speaker :
Future Directions in Terrorism: Challenges, Predictions, and Opportunities for Research *by* ***John Horgan****, Professor of Security Studies at the School of Criminology and Justice Studies; Director of Center for Terrorism & Security Studies, University of Massachusetts Lowell, USA*

Q & A

1310 – 1400hrs **Lunch**
Venue:
Pool Garden, Level 5

1400 – 1530hrs **Panel Three: Religion as a Factor in the Radicalisation into Violent Extremism: The Evidence Assessed**
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom, Level 5

Chairperson:
Tom Parker*, CTITF Adviser on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism at the United Nations*

Speakers:
How Radicals Justify Violence: The Logic Behind Muslim Fundamentalists' Resort to Terrorism *by* ***Noorhaidi Hasan****, Professor, Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia*

Behind Religion: Critically Assessing the Motivations of Indonesian Terrorists *by* ***Greg Fealy****, Associate Professor, Head, Department of Political and Social Change, School of International, Political and Strategic Studies, College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University*

Q & A

1530 – 1540hrs **Tea Break**
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom Foyer, Level 5

1540 – 1710hrs **Panel Four: Behavioural Indicators of Radicalisation into Violent Extremism: Is Early Warning Possible?**
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom, Level 5

Chairperson:
Omer Saifudeen*, Lead Analyst, National Security Risk Assessment Group, National Security Research Centre, Singapore*

Speakers:
The Radicalisation Indicators Model (TRIM) *by* ***Shandon Harris-Hogan****, Research Analyst, Global Terrorism Research Center (GTReC), Monash University, Australia*

Muslim Convert Radicalisation: Scientifically Testing for Predictive Indicators *by* ***Scott Flower****, McKenzie Fellow, SSPS, The University of Melbourne, Australia*

Radicalisation and Pre-Attack Behaviour: Broadening Our Understanding by Diversifying Our Questions *by* ***John Morrison****, Senior Lecturer in Criminology and Criminal Justice, School of Law and Social Sciences, University of East London, UK*

Q & A

1710hrs **End of Day 1 Workshop**

1830 – 2100hrs **Workshop Dinner (by Invitation Only)**

Tuesday, 3 September 2013 (Day 2)

0830 – 0930hrs **Registration**
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom Foyer, Level 5, Marina Mandarin Singapore

Attire:
Smart Casual
(Long-sleeved shirt without tie)

0930 – 1100hrs **Panel Five: Online Radicalisation: Myth or Reality?**
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom, Level 5, Marina Mandarin

Chairperson:
Greg Barton*, Herb Feith Research Professor for the study of Indonesia, School of Political and Social Inquiry, Faculty of Arts, Monash University, Australia*

Speakers:
YouTube Radicals and a Process of Reactive Co-Radicalisation: An Analysis of UK and Australia-based Groups *by* ***Muhammad Iqbal****, Researcher, Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTReC) Monash University, Australia*

TERROR.CO.ID *by* ***Solahudin****, Independent researcher and journalist, Indonesia*

Exploring Pathways to Violent Extremism in the Digital Era *by* ***Luke Gribbon****, Security Policy Researcher, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), UK*

Q & A

1100 – 1120hrs **Tea Break**
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom Foyer, Level 5

1120 – 1220hrs **Panel Six: Countering Online Extremist Narratives: Harnessing the Potential of New Social Media**
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom, Level

Chairperson:
Edwin Bakker*, Director, Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism (CTC), Leiden University, The Netherlands*

Speakers:
Presentation on the NSRC Cyber Extremism Orbital Pathways Model (CEOP) *by* ***Omer Saifudeen****, Lead Analyst, National Security Risk Assessment Group, National Security Research Centre, Singapore*

Making the Most of SOCMINT *by* ***Jonathan Birdwell****, Head of the Citizens Programme, DEMOS, UK*

In the Land of the Blind, the One-eyed Man is King: Constructing 'Counter Narrative' from the Ground Up *by* ***Abdul-Rehman Malik****, Programmes Manager, Radical Middle Way, UK*

1220 – 1400hrs **Lunch**
Venue:
Pool Garden, Level 5

1400 – 1450hrs **Panel Six: Countering Online Extremist Narratives (Continued)**

Speaker :
Unusual Stakeholders in the Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism
by ***Ross Frenett****, Programme Manager, Against Violent Extremism Network, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, UK*

Q & A

1450 – 1620hrs **Panel Seven: Comprehensive Ideological De-Radicalisation of Militants: A Pipe Dream?**
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom, Level 5

Chairperson:
Alex Schmid*, Director, Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), Leiden University, The Netherlands*

Speakers:
Dreams and Disillusionment: Engagement in and Disengagement from Militant Extremist Groups
by ***Tore Bjorgo****, Professor of Police Science, Research Department, Norwegian Police University College, Norway*

Comprehensive Ideological De-Radicalisation of Militants *by* ***Maajid Nawaz****, Co-founder and Chairman, Quilliam Foundation, UK*

Fighting Fire with Water: NGO and Counter-Terrorism Policy Tools *by* ***Tom Parker****, CTITF Adviser on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism at the United Nations*

Q & A

1620 – 1630hrs **Tea Break**
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom Foyer, Level 5

1630 – 1730hrs **Roundtable: Key Takeaways, Gaps in Literature and Other Research Issues**
Venue:
Vanda Ballroom, Level 5

Moderators:
Bilveer Singh*, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), RSIS, NTU and* ***Stuart Croft****, Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Research) University of Warwick*

1730—1740hrs **Concluding Remarks**
(End of CENS-Warwick GR:EEN Workshop)

1830 hrs **Dinner (by Invitation Only)**

LIST OF SPEAKERS AND CHAIRPERSONS

SPEAKERS

Edwin Bakker
Director
Leiden University
Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism (CTC)
Koningin Julianaplein 10
2501 EE The Hague
The Netherlands
Email: e.bakker@cdh.leidenuniv.nl

Greg Barton
Herb Feith Research Professor for the Study of Indonesia
Director International, Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTReC)
School of Political and Social Inquiry (PSI) - Faculty of Arts
Monash University
PO Box 197, Building H, Caulfield Campus
900 Dandenong Road
Caulfield East, VIC 3145
Australia
Email: greg.barton@monash.edu

Jonathan Birdwell
Head of the Citizens Programme
DEMOS, Third Floor
Magdalen House 136-148 Tooley Street
London SE1 2TU
United Kingdom
Email: jonathan.birdwell@demos.co.uk

Tore Bjørgo
Professor of Police Science
Norwegian Police University College
Research Department
P.O. Box 5027, Majorstuen
NO-0301 Oslo
Norway
Email: Tore.Bjorgo@phs.no

Greg Fealy
Associate Professor and Senior Fellow in Indonesian Politics Department of Political and Social Change
School of International, Political and Strategic Studies
ANU College of Asia and the Pacific
Hedley Bull Centre (Building 130)
The Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200
Australia
Email: greg.fealy@anu.edu.au

Scott Flower
McKenzie Fellow
The University of Melbourne
Level 5, 161 Barry Street
Parkville 3010 VIC
Australia
Email: scott.flower@unimelb.edu.au

Ross Frenett
Project Manager
Institute for Strategic Dialogue
48 Charles Street
London W1J 5EN
United Kingdom
Email: rfrenett@strategicdialogue.org

Luke Gribbon
Security Policy Researcher
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
Rusi, 61 Whitehall
London, SW1A 2ET
United Kingdom
Email: LukeG@rusi.org

Shandon Harris-Hogan
Research Analyst
Global Terrorism Research Center (GTReC)
School of Political and Social Inquiry - Faculty of Arts
Monash University
Building H, Level 5, Room H5.48, Caulfield Campus
900 Dandenong Road, Caulfield East, VIC 3145
Australia
Email: shandon.harris-hogan@monash.edu

Noorhaidi Hasan
Professor
Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Yogyakarta
Jl. Marsda Adisucipto Yogyakarta 55122
Indonesia
Email: dekan.fsh@uin-suka.ac.id

John Horgan
Professor, Security Studies at the School of
Criminology and Justice Studies
Director, Center for Terrorism & Security Studies
University of Massachusetts Lowell
870 Broadway St., Lowell, MA 01854
USA
Email: horganjohn@mac.com

Muhammad Iqbal
Researcher
Global Terrorism Research Centre (GTReC)
School of Political and Social Inquiry – Faculty of Arts
Monash University
PO Box 197, Building H, Caulfield Campus
900 Dandenong Road
Caulfield East, VIC 3145
Australia
Email: Muhammad.Iqbal@monash.edu

Abdul-Rehman Malik
Programmes Manager
Radical Middle Way
London, United Kingdom
Email: ar@radicalmiddleway.co.uk

John Morrison
Senior Lecturer
Criminology and Criminal Justice
School of Law and Social Sciences
University of East London
Duncan House, High Street
London, E15 2JB
United Kingdom
Email: morrison@uel.ac.uk

Maajid Nawaz
Co-founder and Chairman
Quilliam Foundation
PO Box 60380,
London, WC1A 9AZ
United Kingdom
Email: maajid.nawaz@quilliamfoundation.org

Farish Noor
Associate Professor
S Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue
Singapore 639798
Email: isbhahmad@ntu.edu.sg

Sulastri Osman
Research Fellow and Coordinator
Radicalisation Studies Programme
Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
S Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue
Singapore 639798
Email: issulastri@ntu.edu.sg

Tom Parker
CTITF Adviser
Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism
United Nations
Room S-1317, New York
NY 10017, USA
Email: parkert@un.org

Omer Saifudeen
Lead Analyst
National Security Research Centre
55 Newton Road
#15-01 Revenue House
Singapore 307987
Email: Omer_Ali_SAIFUDEEN@nscs.gov.sg

Alex Schmid
Visiting Research Fellow
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague
P.O/ Box 13228, 2501 EE The Hague
The Netherlands
Email: apschmid@icct.nl

Bilveer Singh
Adjunct Senior Fellow
Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)
S Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue
Singapore 639798
Email: isbilveer@ntu.edu.sg

Solahudin
Analyst
Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC)
515 B Epicentrum Walk
Jl. HR. Rasuna Said
Jakarta, 12940
Indonesia
Email: solahudin@gmail.com

CHAIRPERSONS

Stuart Croft
Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Research)
University of Warwick
S1.56, Social Sciences Building
Conventry, CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
Email: S.Croft@Warwick.ac.uk

Ralf Emmers
Associate Professor
S Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue
Singapore 639798
Email: ISREmmers@ntu.edu.sg

Norman Vasu
Senior Fellow and Deputy Head
Centre of Execellence for National Security (CENS)
S Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue
Singapore 639798
Email: isnvasu@ntu.edu.sg

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Audrey Ang
Head (TEF)
National Security Coordination Secretariat
55 Newton Road
#15-01 Revenue House
Singapore 307987
Email: audrey_ang@nscs.gov.sg

Royce Chan
Analyst (JCTC)
National Security Coordination Secretariat
55 Newton Road
#15-01 Revenue House
Singapore 307987
Email: Royce_Chan@nscs.gov.sg

Chew Lock Pin
Director
National Security Coordination Secretariat
55 Newton Road
#15-01 Revenue House
Singapore 307987
Email: chew_lock_pin@nscs.gov.sg

Chin Yen Yen
Senior Assistant Director
National Security Coordination Secretariat
55 Newton Road
#15-01 Revenue House
Singapore 307987
Email: chin_yen_yen@nscs.gov.sg

Stephanie Chu
Analyst
New Phoenix Park
28 Irrawaddy Road
Singapore 329560
Email: MHA_Training_Command@mha.gov.sg

Sabrina Chua
Deputy Editor/Presenter
Caldecott Broadcast Centre
Annex Building Level 1
Andrew Road
Singapore 299939
Email: sabrinachua@mediacorp.com.sg

Anupam Dey
Student
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue
Singapore 639798
Email: ANUPAM001@e.ntu.edu.sg

Elaine Ee
Senior Analyst
National Maritime Security System
NMSS Office, AFPN 650
103 Tanah Merah Coast Road
Singapore 498750
Email: elaine_ee@nmss.gov.sg

Joseph Goh
Home Team Academy
501 Old Chua Chu Kang Road
Singapore 698928
Email: goh_chun_hwee@mha.gov.sg

Mahfuh Bin Haji Halimi
Associate Research Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue
Singapore 639798
Email: ismahfuh@ntu.edu.sg

Gerard Han Khai Meng
Assistant Director, Community Engagement
Emergency Preparedness Division
People's Association
9 King George's Avenue
Singapore 208581
Email: Gerard_Han@pa.gov.sg

Elsa Hang Zhao
Master Student
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue
Singapore 639798
Email: elsahangzhao@gmail.com

Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan
Research Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue
Singapore 639798
Email: ismhaniff@ntu.edu.sg

Luke Ho
Covering Head
National Security Risk Assessment
National Security Coordination Secretariat
55 Newton Road,
#15-01 Revenue House
Singapore 307987
Email: luke_ho@nscs.gov.sg

Amir Hussain
Reporter
Caldecott Broadcast Centre
Annex Building Level 1
Andrew Road
Singapore 299939
Email: amirhussain@mediacorp.com.sg

Jason Jevanathan
Senior Assistant Director
Home Team Academy
501 Old Chua Chu Kang Road
Singapore 698928
Email: mark_jason_jevanathan@mha.gov.sg

Mohd Zulkifli Kassim
Senior Assistant Director
Ministry of Home Affairs
New Phoenix Park
28 Irrawaddy Road
Singapore 329560
Email: Md_Zulkifli_Kassim@mha.gov.sg

Yang Razali Bin Kassim
Senior Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue
Singapore 639798
Email: ISYangrazali@ntu.edu.sg

Germaine Koh
Analyst
Ministry of Home Affairs
New Phoenix Park
28 Irrawaddy Road
Singapore 329560
Email: MHA_Training_Command@mha.gov.sg

Lea Yi-Long
Manager
Crisis Communications Department
Ministry of Communications and Information
140 Hill Street, 6th Storey
Old Hill Street Police Station
Singapore 179369
Email: lea_yi-long@mci.gov.sg

Emerald Loh
Account Manager
Ogilvy Public Relations
71 Robinson Road
#07-01
Singapore 068895
Email: emerald.loh@ogilvy.com

Loh Kean Wah
Deputy Director
National Security Coordination Secretariat
55 Newton Road
#15-01 Revenue House
Singapore 307987
Email: loh_kean_wah@nscs.gov.sg

Lisa Rice Madan
Counsellor
Political and Public Affairs
High Commission of Canada
One George Street, #11-01
Singapore 049145
Email: Lisa.RiceMadan@international.gc.ca

Janelle Mak
Analyst
Ministry of Home Affairs
New Phoenix Park
28 Irrawaddy Road
Singapore 329560
Email: MHA_Training_Command@mha.gov.sg

Mohamed Nawab Bin Mohamed Osman
Research Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue
Singapore 639798
Email: ismnawab@ntu.edu.sg

Rosleenda Mohamed Ali
Head Psychologist
Ministry of Home Affairs
New Phoenix Park
30 Irrawaddy Road
Singapore 329561
Email: Rosleenda_Mohamed_Ali@mha.gov.sg

Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin
Associate Research Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue
Singapore 639798
Email: isnurazlin@ntu.edu.sg

Neo Loo Seng
Senior Research Analyst
Home Team Academy
501 Old Chua Chu Kang Road
Singapore 698928
Email: neo_loo_seng@mha.gov.sg

Alvyn Ng
Analyst
Ministry of Home Affairs
New Phoenix Park
28 Irrawaddy Road
Singapore 329560
Email: MHA_Training_Command@mha.gov.sg

Benjamine Ng
Assistant Director, Psychologist
Ministry of Home Affairs
New Phoenix Park
30 Irrawaddy Road
Singapore 329561
Email: Benjamine_NG@mha.gov.sg

Charlotte Ng
Senior Analyst
Ministry of Home Affairs
New Phoenix Park
28 Irrawaddy Road
Singapore 329560
Email: charlotte_ng@nscs.gov.sg

M Nirmala
Senior Correspondent
The Straits Times
1000 Toa Payoh North
News Centre
Singapore 318994
Email: mnirmala@sph.com.sg

Ong Boon Chwee
Analyst
Ministry of Home Affairs
New Phoenix Park
28 Irrawaddy Road
Singapore 329560
Email: MHA_Training_Command@mha.gov.sg

Ong Choon Khiang
Assistant Director, Operations
Emergency Preparedness Division
People's Association
9 King George's Avenue
Singapore 208581
Email: Ong_Choon_khiang@pa.gov.sg

Quek Jing, Jane
Psychologist
Home Team Academy
501 Old Chua Chu Kang Road
Singapore 698928
Email: quek_jane@mha.gov.sg

Roy Rimington
Consultant / Trainer
Civil Service College
31 North Buona Vista Road
Singapore 275983
Email: excelpursuit@gmail.com

Bridget Robert
Deputy Director / Strategic Research Branch
Ministry of Home Affairs
New Phoenix Park
28 Irrawaddy Road
Singapore 329560
Email: bridget_robert@mha.gov.sg

Philip Sim
Deputy Director
Ministry of Communications and Information
140 Hill Street, 6th Storey
Old Hill Street Police Station
Singapore 179369
Email: philip_sim@mci.gov.sg

Susan Sim
Vice-President for Asia
The Soufan Group
20 How Sun Walk
Singapore 538442
Email: susan.lk.sim@gmail.com

Mary-Ann Tan Sze Ming
Analyst
Ministry of Defence
Blk 303, #01-52
Gombak Drive
Singapore 669645
Chia_Buay_Hea@starnet.gov.sg

Tan Yee Chieh
Assistant Director
Training & Development
Emergency Preparedness Division
People's Association
9 King George's Avenue
Singapore 208581
Email: Tan_Yee_Chieh@pa.gov.sg

Tay Zhonghao
Senior Executive
Infrastructure Development Department
Subordinate Courts
1 Havelock Square
Singapore 059724
Email: tay_zhonghao@subct.gov.sg

Tok Hock Soon
Director
Emergency Preparedness Division
People's Association
9 King George's Avenue
Singapore 208581
Email: Tok_Hock_Soon@pa.gov.sg

William Wan
General Secretary
Singapore Kindness Movement Secretariat
140 Hill Street, #05-01
Old Hill Street Police Station
Singapore 179369
Email: william_wan@mccy.gov.sg

Yeong Gah Hou
Senior Director
National Security Coordination Secretariat
55 Newton Road #15-01 Revenue House Singapore 307987
Email: yeong_gah_hou@nscs.gov.sg

ABOUT CENS

The **Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)** is a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Established on 1 April 2006, CENS is devoted to rigorous policy-relevant analysis of a range of national security issues. The CENS team is multinational in composition, comprising both Singaporean and foreign analysts who are specialists in various aspects of national and homeland security affairs.

Why CENS?

In August 2004 the Strategic Framework for National Security outlined the key structures, security measures and capability development programmes that would help Singapore deal with transnational terrorism in the near and long term.

However, strategizing national security policies requires greater research and understanding of the evolving security landscape. This is why CENS was established to increase the intellectual capital invested in strategizing national security. To this end, CENS works closely with not just other RSIS research programmes, but also national security agencies such as the National Security Coordination Secretariat within the Prime Minister's Office.

What research does CENS do?

CENS aspires to be an international research leader in the multi-disciplinary study of the concept of resilience in all its aspects, and in the policy-relevant application of such research in order to promote security within and beyond Singapore.

To this end, CENS conducts research in three main domains:

- *Radicalization Studies*
  The multi-disciplinary study of the indicators and causes of violent radicalization, the promotion of community immunity to extremist ideas and best practices in individual rehabilitation.

- *Social Resilience*
  The inter-disciplinary study of the various constitutive elements of social resilience such as multiculturalism, citizenship, immigration and class. The core focus of this programme is understanding how globalized, multicultural societies can withstand and overcome security crises such as diseases and terrorist strikes.

- *Homeland Defence*
  A broad domain researching key nodes of the national security ecosystem. Areas of particular interest include the study of strategic and crisis communication, cyber security and public attitudes to national security issues.

HOW DOES CENS HELP INFLUENCE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY?

Through policy-oriented analytical commentaries and other research output directed at the national security policy community in Singapore and beyond, CENS staff members promote greater awareness of emerging threats as well as global best practices in responding to those threats. In addition, CENS organizes courses, seminars and workshops for local and foreign national security officials to facilitate networking and exposure to leading-edge thinking on the prevention of, and response to, national and homeland security threats.

HOW DOES CENS HELP RAISE PUBLIC AWARENESS OF NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES?

To educate the wider public, CENS staff members regularly author articles in a number of security and intelligence-related publications, as well as write op-ed analyses in leading newspapers. Radio and television interviews have allowed CENS staff to participate in and shape the public debate on critical issues such as radicalization and counter-terrorism, multiculturalism and social resilience, as well as crisis and strategic communication.

HOW DOES CENS KEEP ABREAST OF CUTTING EDGE NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH?

The lean organizational structure of CENS permits a constant and regular influx of Visiting Fellows of international calibre through the Distinguished CENS Visitors Programme. This enables CENS to keep abreast of cutting edge global trends in national security research.

For more information about CENS,
Visit http://www.rsis.edu.sg/cens

ABOUT RSIS

The **S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)** was officially inaugurated on 1 January 2007. Before that, it was known as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), which was established ten years earlier on 30 July 1996. Like its predecessor, **RSIS** was established as an autonomous entity within Nanyang Technological University (NTU). **RSIS**' aim is to be a leading research institution and professional graduate school in the Asia Pacific. To accomplish this mission, **RSIS** will:

- Provide a rigorous professional graduate education in international affairs with a strong practical and area emphasis
- Conduct policy-relevant research in national security, defence and strategic studies, international political economy, diplomacy and international relations
- Collaborate with like-minded schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence

GRADUATE EDUCATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

RSIS offers a challenging graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The teaching programme consists of the Master of Science (M.Sc.) degrees in Strategic Studies, International Relations, International Political Economy and Asian Studies. Through partnerships with the University of Warwick and NTU's Nanyang Business School, RSIS also offers the NTU-Warwick Double Masters Programme as well as The Nanyang MBA (International Studies). Teaching at **RSIS** is distinguished by its focus on the Asia Pacific region, the professional practice of international affairs and the cultivation of academic depth. Over 230 students, the majority from abroad, are enrolled with the School. A small and select Ph.D. programme caters to students whose interests match those of specific faculty members.

RESEARCH

Research at **RSIS** is conducted by six constituent Institutes and Centres: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS); the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR); the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS); the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies; the Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade & Negotiations (TFCTN) and the Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The School has four endowed professorships that bring distinguished scholars and practitioners to teach and do research at the School. They are the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship in International Relations, the NTUC Professorship in International Economic Relations and the Bakrie Professorship in Southeast Asia Policy.

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

Collaboration with other professional schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is an **RSIS** priority. **RSIS** maintains links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.

For more information about **RSIS**, visit
http://www.rsis.edu.sg

ABOUT NSCS

The **National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS)** was set up in the Prime Minister's Office in July 2004 to facilitate national security policy coordination from a Whole-Of-Government perspective. **NSCS** reports to the Prime Minister through the Coordinating Minister for National Security (CMNS). The current CMNS is Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs Mr Teo Chee Hean.

NSCS is headed by Permanent Secretary (National Security and Intelligence Coordination). The current PS (NSIC) is Mr Benny Lim, who is concurrently Permanent Secretary (National Development) and Permanent Secretary (Prime Minister's Office).

NSCS comprises two centres: the National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC) and the National Security Research Centre (NSRC). Each centre is headed by a Senior Director.

The agency performs three vital roles in Singapore's national security: national security planning, policy coordination, and anticipation of strategic threats. It also organises and manages national security programmes, one example being the Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers, and funds experimental, research or start-up projects that contribute to our national security.

For more information about **NSCS**, visit
http://www.nscs.gov.sg/

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University,
Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
TEL 65-6790-6982 | FAX 65-6793-2991 | EMAIL wwwrsis@ntu.edu.sg | WEBSITE www.rsis.edu.sg